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THE NEW WORLD DISORDER: POWER SHIFTS BETWEEN CONFLICT AND ALLIANCES

A Report on Growth Opportunities

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Executive Summary

The current model of global development is undergoing a profound crisis. It is being replaced by a model of regionalization, marked by the emergence of several distinct centers of power, the most influential of which are likely to be the United States and China.

The shifting balance of power has intensified confrontation among leading countries at geopolitical, military, and economic levels. Traditional mechanisms of global governance are no longer functioning effectively. Trade barriers are rising — from tariffs to newly introduced climate-related regulatory instruments. Barriers to global scientific and technological progress are taking shape due to the monopolization of advanced technologies by developed economies. Nearly 40 percent of global corporate research and development is concentrated in just 50 companies headquartered in a handful of developed countries.

The principal risks of escalating rivalry among global powers include a potential decline in living standards, a reduction in technology transfer, increased inequality, and growing environmental degradation. The entire system of Sustainable Development Goals is under threat. Additional challenges include excessive militarization, the proliferation of armed conflicts, the intensification of protectionism in global trade, and the fragmentation of the world economy. There are rising risks of losing control over critical digital and biotechnologies. Trust among leading nations is eroding, complicating collective responses to global challenges. In particular, human impact on the environment has reached unprecedented levels in recent years, triggering crises related to climate change, industrial pollution, ozone depletion, land degradation, desertification, water scarcity, and biodiversity loss. Humanity still lacks the capacity to fully resolve or mitigate the consequences of these processes. A key factor in alleviating anthropogenic pressure on the planet is coordinated action among nations and the implementation of joint environmental initiatives.

Promising trajectories for global development are emerging against a backdrop of several objective structural features.

First, the balance of power is shifting in favor of developing countries, with China and India becoming the principal leaders of the Global South. This shift generates not only potential flashpoints but also the opportunity to establish new international economic and financial institutions, along with more equitable principles for regulating global development.

Second, there is increasing demand for new forms of international cooperation, grounded in the shared aspiration for a more just and prosperous future for all people. This includes the unification of states, communities, and

individuals around a common responsibility for the Earth and for peaceful development. There is a growing call to reform international organizations so that they better reflect geopolitical and geo-economic transformations underway.

Third, Asia and Africa are emerging as key regions of long-term growth. This is driven by strong demographic dynamics, accelerated economic expansion, and the effects of catch-up development from a low base. Advanced technologies are increasingly diffusing into countries with youthful populations and abundant natural and labor resources.

Fourth, deep transformations are occurring in the technological sphere. New technologies are emerging that can fundamentally alter global markets and societies. The proliferation of digital technologies and artificial intelligence may lead to the emergence of “new poverty” and “new wealth elites” in both developed and developing countries. For public policy, this trend will necessitate a gradual increase in corporate taxation. A greater scale of secondary income redistribution in favor of households will shape new social contracts in the world’s major economies. The evolving global architecture will require a redefinition of the roles of the state and business.

Fifth, demographic dynamics are reshaping models of economic development in both advanced and developing countries. A common global trend is declining fertility and population aging. This will require a substantial reconfiguration of economic structures, with greater emphasis on human capital-intensive sectors, particularly healthcare, and increased labor productivity.

In this context, enhancing global stability will depend on identifying pathways for peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation among states.

A new model of global development must be founded on universal values and the shared pursuit of progress across four interrelated dimensions:

1. achieving a high level of economic development and quality of life;
2. improving population health;
3. preserving the environment;
4. ensuring national and international security.

Russia can actively contribute to shaping a new model of multilateral development that combines dynamic income growth with high performance in healthcare, urban and rural quality of life, security, and environmental sustainability.

At the level of the United Nations, BRICS countries could propose a global co-development initiative — or a broader framework of initiatives — aimed at conflict reduction and support for less developed nations. These measures could include the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, limits on unfair competition, and the reinforcement of long-term development benchmarks. It would be appropriate to organize a series of international negotiations not only in bilateral but also in multilateral formats, involving regional integration organizations such as BRICS, the SCO, the EAEU, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. Agreements in the trade and investment spheres should be complemented by changes in voting rights within international development institutions — including the IMF, World Bank, and WTO — to reflect the growing share of developing economies.

Russia, as one of the world's largest countries in both geographic and economic terms, can play an increasingly prominent role in the formation of a new globalization model. It is capable of uniting the efforts of different states around the goals of development and the creation of a fairer, more human-centered, and environmentally responsible global order. This role may be supported by initiatives focused on accessible energy, food security, connectivity in logistics and communications, partnerships in the knowledge economy, space exploration, and military security. In each of these domains, Russia has the potential to make a significant contribution.

The foundation of Russia's long-term policy toward international partners should be the creation of technological, scientific, and educational alliances. A key area of focus is joint work on critical infrastructure projects and strategic transport corridors. Cooperation is also required to develop systems that are independent of external geopolitical blocs. These include global logistics, satellite communications, financial settlements, information systems, environmental monitoring, and other essential areas. Russia's strategic orientation involves proactively shaping a sovereign center of power that engages with partners at all levels. This model of restructuring the global economy would bring it closer to an economy of inclusive growth, rather than one based on a privileged club of nations. Recalibrating the international model of sustainable development could make it possible to achieve most declared objectives by 2035–2040, overcome hunger, significantly reduce socio-economic inequality, and strengthen trust, fairness, and the ethical foundations of technological progress.

Building a multipolar world based on cooperation — rather than chaos — requires Russia's active participation as a key global actor. Without its constructive involvement, it will be impossible to resolve the critical challenges not only of Eurasia but of the world as a whole.

Russia can achieve above-average growth compared to the global economy by transitioning to an innovation-driven and socially oriented development model. This model would include measures to address demographic constraints through proactive family policy and managed migration, expansion of the middle class, convergence with developed countries in healthcare, education, and

science, leadership in selected high-tech sectors, growth in domestic demand alongside enhanced positions in global markets, increased foreign capital inflows, and a larger role for public debt. Under this scenario, Russia's share in global GDP could rise to 3–3.5 percent, and per capita GDP could increase from the current 55 to 90 percent of the U.S. level over the next two decades.

Like other developing economies, Russia faces the challenge of ascending to higher levels of the global technological hierarchy. Achieving parity with developed countries will require accelerated investment in science and technology, as well as in education. At the same time, it is essential to maintain high population health levels, ensure the competitiveness of traditional industrial and transportation sectors, and integrate effectively into the global economy.

Russia's current demographic trends closely resemble those of developed countries: low and declining fertility, higher maternal age at first birth, and falling infant mortality. While most forecasts predict a decline in Russia's population by at least 5 percent by 2045, a stabilization scenario is possible by 2040 — at a level of 151 to 155 million (including new federal subjects) — through active family support policies, higher birth rates, and moderate migration inflows.

Increased life expectancy and population aging are already placing significant pressure on the pension system and society more broadly. These trends are also generating new demands on the healthcare system. Anticipatory measures are needed, including the creation of infrastructure for healthy longevity, geriatric care, and expanded sanatorium and residential care services. This will require substantial increases in healthcare expenditures, including from public sources.

Economic growth, improved quality of life, and progress toward sustainable development goals increasingly depend not only on the volume of resources used, but also on levels of trust and the quality of social capital. Interpersonal trust in Russia has remained low over the past 30 years. Russian society tends toward a “narrow radius of trust” model — strong trust in one's own circle, but low trust in outsiders¹ — which is typical of societies that have experienced repeated collective traumas from natural or social catastrophes. The core value for most Russian citizens is fairness, which is broadly understood as equal access to healthcare, education, and decent work.

The transition to a co-development and partnership-based economy requires public policies that support three key dimensions of trust:

- 1.** trust based on contracts — ensured through transactional transparency, rule stability, and high reputational costs of misconduct;
- 2.** trust based on cooperation experience — built through self-regulating communities, group work and conflict resolution skills, access to higher education, and expanded social mobility;
- 3.** trust based on a shared destiny — strengthened by civic and universal identity, social imagination, long-term orientation, and a positive vision of the future.

1. Jin, C., Veselov, Y. V., & Skvortsov, N. G. (2024). *Methodology of a Comparative Sociological Study of Trust: The Case of Russia and China*. *Sociological Studies*, (4), 3–13.

World 2025: Geopolitical, Economic, and Environmental Crises

The current model of global development exhibits all the hallmarks of a deep crisis. **Unipolar globalization is in decline**, yet in its final stages it continues to trigger new crises and conflicts worldwide. A potential safeguard against mounting instability could be the emergence of a **new multipolar model**, in which multiple parallel systems operate instead of a single set of global rules. This process of **regionalization**, with the formation of several centers of power, is already underway. The largest of these centers are expected to be led by the United States and China. The central question now is whether these new power centers will be able to reach agreements — or whether systemic confrontations will become a permanent feature of the global landscape.

1.1. Global Development Risks and the Search for a New Model

The current model of global development shows signs of profound crisis. In recent years, humanity has endured several major shocks. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2021 caused significant human losses and exposed the vulnerability of nearly all national healthcare systems. The World Health Organization considers the risk of a new pandemic to be substantial. How prepared is humanity for future pandemics and mounting demographic challenges?

Geopolitical crises—manifested in armed conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Syria, as well as the tense

standoff between NATO and Russia—have effectively dismantled the international security system that took shape in the 1990s. The world has entered an era of hybrid wars and possibly a new arms race. How can the protracted military-political confrontation be overcome and replaced with a constructive and peaceful dialogue?

At the current stage, the global economy is facing mounting development risks. First, a trend toward the militarization of major economies has emerged, which hinders investment in human capital. For example, over the past 18



Vladimir Putin,

President of the Russian Federation

"We must remember that the world is not only about competition, but also about cooperation."

years, global spending on education has nearly doubled, but military expenditures have doubled as well. Many countries, including several in the European Union, have announced substantial increases in defense spending in the coming years. This new arms race threatens global stability, fuels conflict between the world's leading powers, and reduces the potential for international cooperation.

Second, after a period of trade liberalization and tariff reduction, the world is witnessing a rise in protectionism. Trade wars, initiated by the current U.S. administration against China and many other countries, are expected to slow global economic growth by 0.2–0.3 percentage points, inflicting over \$3 trillion in damage—mostly on developing and newly industrialized countries.

The goals of the energy transition to a green economy with low greenhouse gas emissions, as proclaimed in the Paris and Glasgow Agreements, remain distant from their targets. Moreover, climate policy is increasingly used as a tool in competitive rivalry.

Third, new risks have emerged as the global trade model undergoes transformation. These are driven by trends toward economic fragmentation and disunity among major powers in achieving shared development objectives. The model of globalization that emerged after the collapse of the USSR and the sustainability paradigm developed since the late 1970s appear exhausted. The risks of fragmentation include slowing trade volumes and global GDP, stagnation in living standards, and reduced efficiency in research and development investment.

Fourth, regress is evident in several critical areas of human development. Recent UN reports paint an alarming picture: the global community is not only failing to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but is also falling further behind in many areas. According to expert forecasts², by 2030, none of the 17 SDGs will be fully achieved: partial success will be attained in 11 goals (65%), while 6 goals (35%) will be in a state of regression.

Even when examining the more specific 169³ targets that underpin the 17 SDGs, the outlook remains

2. Sachs, J. D., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., Drumm, E. (2023). *Implementing the SDG Stimulus. Sustainable Development Report 2023*. Paris: SDSN, Dublin: Dublin University Press, 2023. 10.25546/102924.

3. *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2024: N.Y. UN, 2024. These estimates differ only marginally from the figures presented in the Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General. A/79/79-E/2024/54. 2 May 2024.*


only marginally more optimistic. According to the UN's 2024 SDG progress report, only 17% of the targets are expected to be achieved by 2030. Thus, more than one-third of the global goals and targets will remain unmet, or current performance will deteriorate further.

The gap in SDG performance between high-income and

low-income countries is also widening. By 2030, this divide—as measured by the SDG Index—is projected to be greater than it was in 2015, when countries first adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Despite several decades of dynamic growth in global agri-food production, hunger remains a pressing global issue, especially in the

Figure 1 Progress on Achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals Based on Selected Target Assessments (Trend Data from 2015 to 2024)



poorest countries. The declining trend in global hunger—from 785 million people in 2000 to 539 million in 2014, according to FAO estimates—was largely driven by globalization and rapid economic growth in developing countries. However, this trend reversed in the second half of the 2010s. Since the early 2020s, the number of people suffering from hunger has risen again—reaching 672 million in 2024.

This increase has been driven by more frequent droughts, armed conflicts, and rising food prices. In March 2022, the FAO Food Price Index reached a historic peak—160% above the 2014–2016 average. As of February 2025, it remains high at 127%. Over the long term, pressures in the agri-food market are likely to intensify. Meanwhile, the shift toward sustainable agriculture, organic farming, and climate-neutral production may reduce productivity in the agricultural sector, further complicating efforts to address the global food crisis. How many more decades and what kinds of technological and social transformations will be required for humanity to resolve the problem of hunger?

What will humanity's medium- and long-term future look like? How can we overcome today's challenges and move toward a world of sustainable and balanced development?

Despite mounting global risks—including military threats and conflicts—hope persists. It is fueled not only by rapid technological progress and fundamental shifts

in biotech, digital technologies, and artificial intelligence, but also by the ongoing search for a new configuration of international cooperation.

Countries are responding to these challenges in diverse ways, but there is a discernible tendency toward two dominant development models.

The Atlantic model—primarily Anglo-Saxon with varying degrees of European social state elements—is characterized by the leadership of developed countries, particularly the United States, in finance, technology, and global governance institutions. This model features high levels of social inequality (somewhat tempered in the European variant) and the dominance of private corporate interests over the public good. The current crisis is prompting efforts in the U.S. and Western Europe to reinvent industrial policy.

The Chinese model has enabled China to evolve from an underdeveloped economy into a relatively advanced nation, combining sustained high growth, technological progress, and social justice. This model appeals to many developing and newly industrialized nations and incorporates lessons from their own development trajectories. Amid trade wars and protectionism, China has advocated for free trade and promoted regional partnerships through the Belt and Road Initiative and the concept of a “Community of Shared Future.”

Leaning toward either model entails setting national development

priorities and shaping institutional and sectoral structures accordingly. Russia initially aligned with the Atlantic model but has since begun shifting toward the Chinese approach, while retaining elements of the European social state. Such hybridization is not unique. Many countries combine elements from different dominant development models.

Increasingly, a new cooperative development model is emerging for countries that, for various reasons, cannot fully adopt either the Chinese or Euro-Atlantic paths. Over the past decades, these countries have relied on regional cooperation strategies to overcome technological backwardness. Each nation claims responsibility for specific technologies or markets, while delegating other competencies to alliance partners.

For instance, amid global economic instability and rising protectionism, China is advancing alternative frameworks for international cooperation. As a counterbalance to the Western trade system, it has launched the Belt and Road Initiative and the “Community of Shared

Future,” positioning them as platforms for free trade and enhanced regional connectivity. This concept includes four programs: the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. If enriched with concrete projects and aligned with partner countries’ proposals, these initiatives could become the foundation of a new global development model.

In the absence of a universal economic integration model that meets all countries’ needs, multiple cooperation formats are evolving in parallel. Regionalization models differ in how much national authority is delegated to supranational institutions. Each system has advantages and limitations. A “soft” integration example is ASEAN, which coordinates policies without binding commitments—preserving national sovereignty but limiting coordination. At the other end is the European Union, with significant transfer of legislative, budgetary, and judicial powers to supranational bodies. Yet this model is also confronting limitations to its effectiveness. Hybrid



James K. Galbraith,

Professor at the University of Texas

"There is an inherent conflict between maintaining competitive domestic production and the global role of the U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasury debt as reserve assets — a conflict that, in effect, raises the cost of doing business in the United States."



Table 1. Global Risks and Opportunities

Global Risks	Global Opportunities
Geopolitical crisis. Lack of trust	Confidence-building measures and peacebuilding initiatives. A new model of global security
Economic tensions and conflicts	Multipolar integration systems and new multilateral trade arrangements
Climate and environmental threats, pollution	Climate adaptation partnerships and multilateral environmental initiatives—particularly in clean water and air
Technological polarization and loss of control over biotechnology and AI	Regional technology partnerships, joint R&D initiatives, ethical and legal standards for AI and biotech
Social polarization and unmanaged migration	Social initiatives
Population aging and health risks	Silver economy development

Sources: *The Global Risks Report 2025, World Economic Forum; authors' estimates*

models like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which combine common markets with national sovereignty in key areas, appear most promising.

Despite differences in institutional frameworks, all countries strive for high levels of economic development, population health, environmental quality, and security. Quality-of-life assessments reveal not only significant inequality but also stagnation in well-being improvements in recent years⁴.

In quality-of-life rankings, the U.S. and China lead in economic performance, while Northern European countries rank highest in health and well-being. Russia occupies a mid-tier position in quality of life, ecology, and natural wealth (Annex 2). However, by 2050, it could become a global leader if it pursues a multilateral development model that combines dynamic income

growth with improvements in health, urban and rural environments, safety, and environmental sustainability.

Despite diverse national development paths and deep international divisions, a global trend is emerging toward collaborative solutions to shared challenges—from geopolitical conflict and demographic pressure to environmental risks and inequality.

Regionalization will likely intensify many of the global risks described above. At the same time, it will heighten demand for new forms of international cooperation to mitigate their adverse effects. Accordingly, a revival of global dialogue platforms such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, along with the growing importance of emerging partnerships like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, can be expected.

4. The slowdown in the improvement of the Human Development Index (HDI) is noted, in particular, in the latest United Nations report — *The 2025 Human Development Report (2025)*.

Table 2. Matrix of Interlinkages Across Key Areas of Socio-Economic Development

	Development	Technology	Health	Human Capital	Environment
Economic Development	Meeting basic needs; material foundation of society	Industry is the foundation for the reproduction and development of technologies	Health is 40% determined by socio-economic factors	Reducing inequality is impossible without sustainable economic growth. An additional year of schooling increases GDP growth by 1.2 p.p. per year	Environmental risks and damage
Human Capital	Increased demand for income redistribution through public budgets	Low wages may lead to a stagnation in innovation. Technologies reduce requirements for a large share of the labor force	Lower life expectancy	Poverty trap. Limited access to quality education and healthcare services reduces human capital realization	Lack of resources to compensate for environmental damage
Technology	Technological development is a key driver of economic growth	Technological revolutions and shifts in global structures	Increased healthy and active life expectancy through medical technology	Technological development increases labor productivity, but also poses unemployment risks. Social capital development becomes a priority for scientific and technological progress	Reduced environmental burden
Health	With increased life expectancy, healthcare becomes economically significant	Healthcare and pharmaceuticals become key sectors of STI	Human potential realization	Inequality in access to healthcare services. Human potential is realized over a longer time horizon	Environmental health becomes a political issue

Today, convergence around core development issues is occurring more within societies than at the level of states. A prime example of such civic consensus is the dialogue “Future of the World: A New Platform for Global Growth,” initiated in Moscow. The majority of contributions (41% of essays) focused on investment in human capital. Other widely discussed themes included the connectivity of value chains, technological advancement, and environmental sustainability.

The emerging model of sustainable development may be understood as a triad:

DHN – Development, Health/ Happiness, Nature, or

SSS – Sustainable development, Societal and Somatic health (or Sovereign population), Sustainability of nature and ecology.

At the core of this model lies a vision of a happier future for all, underpinned by shared responsibility among states, communities, and individuals for the Earth and peaceful development.

1.2. Structural Crisis of the Economy and Trade: Toward a New Globalization Model

The current crisis of the global economic and political order is not a coincidence. It marks the exhaustion of a long cycle of globalization in the world economy. Today's global economy is undergoing an institutional crisis and a shift in the balance of power among major economic centers, amid declining trust and weakening partnership mechanisms. Geopolitical tensions will remain elevated due to the loss of former economic advantages and growing friction between traditional and emerging centers of power — in international trade, in the restructuring of global value chains, in the international settlement and currency systems, and in intensifying technological competition.

For the global economy and individual countries, this means lower income levels and, therefore, reduced ability to overcome key development constraints. This leads to increased volatility in major economic indicators, declining quality of life, restricted technology transfer, growing inequality, and environmental risks.


The structural crisis of the global economy will be driven by the exhaustion of growth factors and the deepening of structural constraints, which will manifest in key indicators of global development.

Development – Technology – Competition (Freedom) – Governance – Finance – Transformation of the Global Economy – New and Traditional Industries

Global trade has never been truly equitable. The admission of developing countries to the markets of advanced economies has historically been contingent upon requirements to open domestic markets, surrender national natural resources to the control of transnational capital, and cement the monopoly of developed nations over intellectual property and high technologies. In recent years, there has been exponential growth in non-tariff trade restrictions imposed by various countries for different reasons. In terms of their impact, these measures have come to replace tariffs and are equally limiting to global development. Developed economies use intellectual property protection to maintain scientific and technological leadership and to extract technology rents from developing countries in exchange for regulated access to their markets. In 2025, new tariff-based trade restrictions moved to the top of the global agenda.

The main risk of global confrontation is a significant decrease in the quality of life and the approach of an ecological crisis of the planet

Figure 2. Assessing the Impact of Global Challenges on the World Economy



The size of each bubble is proportional to the estimated impact on the world economy.

Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

Beyond open protectionism, certain countries have carried out irresponsible attacks on the trade infrastructure of their competitors. The blockade of the Suez Canal, the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, and large-scale cyberattacks have revealed the vulnerability of global supply chains. These events are fueling instability in markets and worsening growth prospects. Gas prices in the EU fluctuated from USD 300 to USD 2,000 per 1,000 cubic meters.

There is an urgent need for a fundamental change in the principles governing tariff and non-tariff trade measures, as well as a new global consensus on regulatory mechanisms — including the rejection of economic blockade measures at the international level.

The U.S.–China trade conflict has significantly amplified global risks. As a result, a new reality is emerging in which all major actors are pursuing industrialization or re-industrialization of their national economies, along with an accelerated technological race — often at the cost of economic efficiency. Technology is becoming the primary condition for maintaining or gaining leadership across all major power centers.

The most probable scenario appears to be one in which a regionalized global economy gives rise to two or more competing macro-regions, with accelerating scientific and technological progress in large developing countries.

One possible configuration of such a super-regional bloc could

be a U.S.–EU economic and trade alliance, although the United States' current policy of reindustrializing its economy and reshoring critical industries runs counter to this integrative effort. Meanwhile, trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU are encouraging increased trade and economic cooperation between the EU and China.

The second major economic region is the Global South, with the Chinese economy at its center – or more accurately, with multiple integration poles located in China, India, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and the post-Soviet space, where Russia plays a central coordinating role. This kind of multilayered and multi-speed globalization may replace the current crisis-prone and fragmented global economic order.

At present, the leading centers of global economic power remain the United States, China, and the European Union. The United States (together with Canada and Mexico)

accounts for nearly 70% of global GDP, over 60% of global real-sector output, and the bulk of global R&D and defense expenditures. However, the center of global economic activity is steadily shifting toward the countries of Greater Eurasia, where China's slowing growth is being offset by India and Indonesia's accelerating development. Greater Eurasia already accounts for over half of the global population, and its share of global GDP could rise from 40.8% in 2021–2025 to 45% by 2035 (Table 3). According to PwC estimates, by 2050 the E7's share of global GDP (PPP) will grow from 35% to 50%. China will be the largest global economy, producing no less than 20% of global GDP, followed by India, with Russia (under an optimistic scenario) ranking fourth alongside Indonesia⁵.

Following the industrialization and urbanization of Southeast Asia, countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria are now actively pursuing their own industrialization strategies. A new phase of Africa's awakening is also

5. *The Long View. How will the global economic order change by 2050?* PwC, 2017, p. 5.

Figure 3 Projected Changes in Market Restrictions by 2035



Figure 4 Projected Changes in the Stability of the Global Financial System by 2035



● Will Improve

● Will Worsen

Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.



Wang Wen,

Professor and Executive Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies

"China does not reject international cooperation, but in the face of global market uncertainty and US pressure, it is moving toward a more independent and controlled cooperation model."

underway — characterized not only by rapid population growth but also by significant economic momentum.

High growth rates in developing countries are underpinned not only by population growth and higher accumulation rates, but also by improved production efficiency — driven both by imported advanced technologies and the development of national scientific and technological capabilities in countries like China and India.

As the global balance of power shifts, tensions between leading countries are intensifying across geopolitical, military, and economic dimensions. International economic and trade institutions have lost their effectiveness; new barriers are emerging — from tariffs to carbon adjustment mechanisms; and the global security system is breaking down.

Barriers to global scientific and technological development are forming due to the monopoly of developed countries over leading-edge technologies. Leading

economies are allocating as much — or even more — funding to R&D as to defense. In Russia, EAEU countries, and potential allies, the reverse situation is observed: with smaller overall budgets, defense expenditures exceed R&D spending by several multiples. This reflects both existing strategic priorities and the structural positioning of these economies in global value chains.

Despite the growing pace of development in emerging markets, income and quality-of-life disparities remain stark. Only a few countries have succeeded in narrowing the gap with the so-called “golden billion.” Key conditions for bridging this gap include accelerated investment in science, technology, and education; improvements in public health; and enhanced competitiveness of traditional industrial and transport sectors. Effective macro-regional integration and labor division are also essential.

The long-term growth trajectory will be shaped by demographic aging and rising dependency ratios — against the backdrop of slowing

Table 3 Key Economic Indicators of Centers of Power in the Global Economy

	GDP (PPP), \$ bln (2023)	Real Sector GVA*, \$ bln (2022)	Labor Force, mln people (2023)	Foreign Trade Turnover (goods)**, \$ bln (2023)	High-Tech Exports***, \$ bln (2022)	Defense Spending, \$ bln (2022)	R&D Spending, \$ bln (2021)	Budget Balance (% of GDP, 2024)	Public Debt (% of GDP, 2024)
USA	27 361	4977	171	5192	166	877	816	-3,6	121
Canada	2469	543	22	1140	30	27	34	-1,9	111
Mexico	3289	546	60	1214	86	9	4	0,2	58
USA+	33 119	6066	253	7546	283	912	853	-3,2	117
European Union	27 125	4189	222	14 234	837	258	394	-1,6	82
China	34 644	8573	779	5937	770	292	434	-6,4	88
Russia	6452	822	72	728	11	86	17,7	-1,5	20
Belarus	282	30	5	83	1	0,8	0,3	2,4	44
Union State	6735	852	77	811	11	87	18	-1,4	21
Kazakhstan	783	91	10	139	5	1,1	0,3	-0,8	25
Kyrgyzstan	50	4	3	16	0,1	0,1	0,0	2,7	37
Armenia	64	7	1	21	0,5	0,8	0,0	-0,7	50
EAEU	7632	954	91	987	17	89	18	-1,3	22
Tajikistan	52	5	3	7	0,0	0,1	0,0	-1,8	30
Turkmenistan	105	35	2	13	0,0	0,1	0,0	0	5
Uzbekistan	354	44	14	57	0,1	1,4	0,1	-1,6	33
Iran	1162	159	29	156	0,1	6,8	2,8	-2,4	37
EAEU+	9305	1197	140	1221	17	98	21	-1,4	24

Sources: World Bank, UN, authors' calculations

* Agriculture, industry, construction

** Excluding intra-group trade within regional blocs

growth in working-age populations across major economies. Geopolitical tensions are likely to persist, fueling further economic fragmentation. These factors will contribute to slower economic growth in many countries, reduce the efficiency of cross-border and cross-sector capital and labor allocation, and hinder technology transfer to developing nations — thereby constraining their convergence. At the same time, these challenges may spur increased national investment in R&D.

China could overtake the United States in market-price GDP by the late 2040s, thanks to sustained capital accumulation, expanded AI and robotics deployment, and faster productivity gains relative to the United States. By 2050, China could account for nearly a quarter of global GDP, with India close behind — together producing almost one-third of global output.

If current trends persist, Russia's share of global GDP (market prices) will remain around 2%. Faster growth would be possible under a transition to an innovation-driven, socially oriented development model. This would entail overcoming demographic constraints

through proactive family policy and managed migration; expanding the middle class; achieving developed-country benchmarks in healthcare, education, and science; attaining leading positions in key technologies; boosting domestic demand; strengthening positions in global markets; attracting foreign capital; and increasing public debt. Under this scenario, Russia's share of global GDP could reach 3–3.5%, and GDP per capita could approach 90% of U.S. levels (up from 55% today).

The trajectory of global economic development will largely depend on gains in energy efficiency and the adoption of lower-carbon energy technologies — or even direct energy consumption constraints — as well as the timing of global decarbonization. According to VEB Institute projections, global per capita energy consumption may grow by more than 16% between 2023 and 2050. Asia and Africa — driven by rapid population growth, accelerated economic expansion, and low-base convergence effects — will be the key regions of long-term energy demand growth. These regions represent the main potential for expanding Russia's energy and petrochemical exports.

Figure 5 Projected Changes in the Security of Economic Infrastructure by 2035



Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

Priorities of the Global Development Economic Model



**Achieving a High Level of
Economic Development**



**Improving Public Health
and Quality of Life**



**Preserving the
Environment**



**Ensuring National
Security**

Contemporary technological progress is having a contradictory impact on income distribution. In developed countries, the rise of fintech and digital technologies — alongside the offshoring of real-sector production — has deepened inequality and triggered a middle-class income crisis. Demand is increasingly polarized between high-paid and low-paid jobs. A pivot to reindustrialization could revive the traditional middle class but might also slow economic growth and exacerbate inequality.

In developing countries, industrialization and urbanization are leading to greater societal stratification and the emergence of new forms of poverty.

Whether the spread of digital technologies and artificial intelligence will lead to the formation of a “new poor” and a “new wealthy class” — both in developed and developing countries — remains an open question. The answer lies not only in technology but in the social domain.

Maintaining living standards and quality of life will require additional redistribution of income toward less affluent population groups. For public policy, this will mean gradually increasing corporate taxation. In turn, expanded secondary redistribution of income will create the conditions for a new social contract in many of the world’s largest economies.

Solving the problem of inequality — both within and between countries — remains a key global challenge. It will require fairer resource allocation, expanded investment in education and healthcare, new approaches to social protection, targeted anti-discrimination efforts, and stronger international cooperation mechanisms. The shift in global economic power toward developing countries — led by China and India — creates an opportunity to build a new system of international economic institutions and more equitable global development frameworks.

Table 4 Scale of Integration Blocs and Individual Countries (share of global GDP, PPP, %)

	2011–2015	2016–2020	2021–2025	2026–2030	2031–2035
EAEU	4,0	3,8	4,2	4,0	3,8
Russia	3,4	3,2	3,5	3,3	3,1
EAEU +	4,2	4,0	4,4	4,3	4,1
G7	33,8	31,4	29,2	26,5	24,4
E7	32,7	35,8	38,8	40,8	42,9
BRICS	27,4	30,4	34,1	38,3	40,5
SCO+	28,3	31,8	35,0	37,2	39,5
ASEAN	5,7	6,2	6,2	6,6	7,1
Greater Eurasia	34,0	38,0	41,2	43,8	46,6
European Union	18,2	17,3	16,2	13,5	12,4
USA	16,5	15,6	14,9	13,9	13,0

Notes: EAEU+ includes Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. E7: China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey. SCO+ includes Belarus, Iran, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Greater Eurasia = SCO+ + ASEAN.

Sources: VEB Institute, IMF calculations

Table 5. Inequality in Economic Development and Energy Consumption

	Share of Global GDP (Market Prices), %		GDP per Capita (PPP), % of U.S.		Primary Energy Consumption per Capita, % of U.S.	
	2023	2050	2023	2050	2023	2050
World	100	100	28	35	27	35
America	34	28	51	49	50	55
USA	26	22	100	100	100	100
Europe*	26	20	59	62–65	47	62
EU-28	21	15	73	72	54	55
Russia	2,0	3–3,5	55	63–80	75	85–95
Asia**	36	47	23	41	24	38
China	17	23	31	60	43	80
India	3,4	8,0	13	36	9,4	27
Middle East	2,8	2,8	29	28	46	59
Africa	2,8	4,6	8,0	9,8	5,9	6,7
North Africa	0,9	1,0	17	19	19	23
Sub-Saharan Africa	2,0	3,6	6,0	8,1	3,1	3,8

* Includes Turkey

** Excludes the Middle East

Sources: UN, IMF, EIA, VEB Institute calculations

1.3. Technological Rivalry

Technology has become a key prerequisite for maintaining or acquiring technological leadership among all major global power centers. A new reality is emerging in which all leading players are pursuing the industrialization or re-industrialization of their national economies and entering a technological race — often at the expense of efficiency.

The modern global economy and technology sector are undergoing profound changes, comprising three interrelated processes:

1. The emergence of new technologies capable of fundamentally transforming global markets and society. These include: general artificial intelligence (strong AI), robotics, virtualized travel and education, digitalization of business decision-making and implementation, unmanned delivery systems, and low-carbon energy and transportation.
2. The integration of cutting-edge technologies into traditional industries, resulting in the transformation of sectoral standards, and the diffusion of "previously new" technologies (e.g., CNC machines, solar panels, ICT, 4G internet) into countries with cheap labor and natural resources and young populations — such as Indonesia and various African nations.
3. A sharp rise in competition and reconfiguration of key energy and commodity markets triggered by the Western blockade of Russia.

Environmental and hydrocarbon standards are increasingly used as tools to push competitors out of the most profitable market segments — particularly by the European Union.

Russia and other major developing countries face the task of raising their overall level of technological development and moving up the global technological hierarchy.

The main risks to scientific and technological development include the monopoly of developed countries over key technologies and the closed nature of core research and development (R&D) within global power centers.

Leading countries are not only expanding their technological advantages, but also increasingly diverging in their areas of specialization, forming competing centers of technological influence. The two primary global innovation hubs — the United States and China — are actively pursuing technological decoupling. If this trend continues, it will result in the emergence of parallel techno-economic systems with distinct standards and minimal interaction. For the global economy, this would mean a medium- and long-term decline in R&D efficiency and growing barriers to scientific and technological cooperation and exchange.

If the trend toward technological fragmentation persists, it will slow global economic growth, particularly in terms of productivity and

Competing technological systems with different standards and weak cooperation are being formed

innovation. Conversely, coordinated efforts to address global challenges in healthcare, energy, and digital technologies could benefit humanity as a whole and reduce inequality in access to health, science, and technology.

R&D expenditures in developing countries remain significantly lower than those in developed nations, accounting for about one-third of the global total — a proportion that has remained relatively stable. In China, the R&D sector has experienced rapid growth, while in India, Brazil, and Russia, its growth has been more modest.

Roughly 40% of all corporate R&D in the world is concentrated in just 50 major companies headquartered in a handful of developed countries.


Geographically, scientific and technological capacity is concentrated in three "growth poles": North America, Western Europe, and East Asia.

The United States remains the largest source of corporate research, accounting for over 42% of global corporate R&D spending. The EU ranks second, with

approximately 18.7%, and China has reached comparable levels, contributing about 17.1% of the total by 2023. Japan follows at a considerable distance (8.3%), along with a group of "other countries" (13.5%) that includes the UK, South Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, and others. In total, the leading technological centers — the U.S., EU, China, Japan, and a few other developed economies — account for more than 85% of global corporate R&D investment. Russia is represented only by a few companies, which appear at the bottom of international rankings⁶. However, in terms of overall scientific and technological capability, Russia ranks eighth globally, below its position by GDP.

Today's corporate R&D is primarily concentrated in the digital economy — including software and digital services, information and communication technologies, and electronics production; the bioeconomy — including pharmaceuticals and medical equipment; and the automotive industry. These three sectors account for more than 75% of global R&D spending. Over the past decade, investment in digital technologies — particularly software and services — has grown fastest, with an average annual increase of around 13% worldwide. Pharmaceutical and electronics sectors have grown by about 7% and 6–7% per year, respectively. The automotive sector also remains a key driver of R&D (global growth ~6.3% per year), driven by increased electronics integration and the transition to electric vehicles.

6. At various times, Russian companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Russian Helicopters, United Aircraft Corporation, TNK-BP, AvtoVAZ, Irkutskenergo, Sitronics, and KamAZ have appeared in the rankings.

Figure 6 Assessing the Impact of New Global Development Factors on the World Economy

The size of each bubble is proportional to the estimated impact on the world economy.

Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

Artificial Intelligence (AI).

The wave of AI deployment across various domains — including vital sectors — combined with its increasing complexity and reduced transparency, significantly enhances productivity and management capabilities while transforming healthcare, education, and scientific research. However, AI also poses risks of critical system failures — in life-support, energy, transportation, and security — that could emerge suddenly and unpredictably, even to system operators. A potential point of no return may come when AI begins to autonomously manage a system of artificial intelligences operating in essential sectors. Ethical debates surrounding AI development are actively unfolding in both the scientific community and broader society.

Biotechnology.

Rapid advancements in biomedical technologies are enabling the treatment of previously incurable diseases and extending human life. At the same time, interventions in the human genome raise new ethical concerns and may alter the human species itself. More laboratories are working with highly dangerous pathogens, tackling increasingly sensitive tasks. At some point, a violation of biosecurity protocols could lead to the outbreak of dangerous or unknown diseases.

Electric Power.

Demand for electricity continues to rise, with an increasing number of system components critically dependent on weather conditions and operational regimes.

As system management becomes more complex, the risks and costs of systemic failures and technical disasters grow.

Labor Market Transformations.

A key trend is the expanding use of automated monitoring and advisory systems for workers. This may lead to the formation of a multi-layered management system with alternating control by humans over machines and vice versa. As a result, many professions could see a simplification of work, reduced educational requirements, and lower wages.

Agrotechnology and the New Green Revolution.

Technologies such as genome editing, genetic engineering in plant breeding, minimal soil treatment techniques, precision agriculture using satellites and drones, the

Internet of Things, and big data analytics are becoming key tools in the global agro-food market.

Denying developing countries (including Russia) access to these technologies strengthens the position of agricultural exporters from developed countries but reduces the productivity of the global agricultural system.

For various reasons, the world's leading countries have prioritized technological breakthroughs. A fierce race for technological leadership and the extraction of technology rents is underway. Technological leadership is increasingly determining countries' positions in the global hierarchy. At the same time, intensifying competition raises questions about the prospects for international scientific cooperation and the ethical boundaries of technological progress.

Technological rivalry may lead to loss of control over the outspread of technology

1.4. Preserving the Population: Human Capital, Demography, and Health

The global demographic situation has a direct impact on the economic development model in both major developed and developing countries. A general trend is emerging: declining birth rates and population aging. This will necessitate a significant restructuring of economies toward greater emphasis on human capital-intensive sectors (particularly healthcare) and more efficient utilization of labor resources.


Life expectancy at birth — a key mortality indicator — has steadily risen over the past decades. In 1960, global life expectancy stood at 51 years; by 1980, it had reached

62 years; by 2000 — 68 years. In 2023, the global life expectancy was 73.3 years. According to the UN's medium demographic forecast, it will reach 77 years by 2050.

Global fertility intensity (total fertility rate, TFR) has also declined: 4.7 in 1960, 3.7 in 1980, 2.7 in 2000, and 2.2 in 2023. The UN projects a continued, albeit slower, decline to 2.1 children per woman by 2050.

By the end of 2022, the world's population exceeded 8 billion. Between 1960 and 2023, it grew 2.67 times — from 3.02 to 8.06 billion people. The UN forecasts nearly a 20% increase by 2050, although this growth will be slower than in previous decades.

**Decline in Fertility Rate
(Children per Woman)**



Source: World Bank

According to most forecasts, Russia's population is expected to decline by at least 5% by 2045. However, with effective family-support policies and increased birth rates (e.g., to France's level), and under moderate net migration, stabilization at 151–155 million people (including new territories) is possible. Depopulation will be more pronounced in China and Japan, with expected population declines of 11% and 16%, respectively, by 2050.

Meanwhile, population growth will continue in some large developing countries. The UN projects 16% growth in India and 14% in Indonesia by 2050. The U.S. population is also expected to grow by 14%, largely due to sustained immigration — an atypical pattern

Table 6 Historical and Projected Average Annual Population of the World and Selected Countries, 1960–2050

	millions of people					change, %			
	1960	1980	2000	2023*	2050**	1980 to 1960	2000 to 1980	2023 to 2000**	2050 to 2023***
World	3022	4438	6162	8062	9664	46,9	38,9	30,8	19,9
Russia*	120	139	147	146	139	15,9	5,5	-0,3	-5,0
China	667	981	1263	1411	1260	47,1	28,7	11,7	-10,7
India	436	687	1058	1438	1680	57,7	53,9	35,9	16,8
Brazil	72	121	174	211	217	67,4	43,6	21,3	3,0
Indonesia	88	149	216	281	321	68,7	45,1	30,1	14,1
Japan	93	117	127	125	105	25,3	8,6	-1,8	-15,6
USA	181	227	282	335	381	25,8	24,2	18,7	13,7
Germany	73	78	82	83	78	7,5	5,0	1,3	-6,0

* Population for Russia does not include newly incorporated territories

** 2024 data used for Russia instead of 2023

*** 2045 forecast used for Russia instead of 2050

Note. Due to differences between World Bank and UN data for 2023, growth rates may slightly differ from those based solely on UN statistics

Sources: Historical data: Rosstat, World Bank

Forecast for Russia: Medium variant of Rosstat's 2023 demographic forecast (final point – 2045)

Forecast for other countries: Medium variant of the UN's 2024 demographic forecast

Table 7 Country Grouping by Demographic Development Model

Wealthy Eastern countries with strong sociocultural norms (5 countries)	Developed (Western) countries (48 countries)	Countries with developed-world social patterns but low incomes (24 countries)	Lagging states (14 countries)	Countries at a demographic crossroads (5 countries)	Poor countries or those in an early demographic transition (75 countries)
High income, high fertility rate, low infant mortality	High income, low fertility rate and low infant mortality	Low income, low fertility rate and low infant mortality	Low income and fertility rate, high infant mortality	Low income, high fertility rate, low infant mortality	Low income, high fertility rate and high infant mortality
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kazakhstan	UAE, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, USA, France, South Korea, Japan, Poland, Malaysia, Russia	Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, China, Serbia, Albania, Georgia, Mexico, Thailand, Iran	Azerbaijan, Brazil, India, Bhutan, Moldova, Vietnam, Philippines, Peru	Belize, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Tonga	Indonesia, South Africa, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Bolivia, African nations

Source: World Bank, 2023

Note. For the purposes of this classification, the income threshold (GDP per capita at PPP) was set at 50% of the corresponding indicator for high-income countries, in line with the World Bank methodology (this level is assumed to exceed the poverty line in high-income economies). The threshold for infant mortality corresponds to the average level observed in upper-middle-income countries. The fertility rate threshold was set at 2 — the level required for simple population replacement.

among developed countries. Demographic dynamics may vary across social systems. High birth rates can exist even in high-income countries.

While population size is crucial for economic growth, the role of the family — and its current crisis in developed countries — is even more socially significant. This crisis manifests in high divorce rates, childless families, and a growing number of single-person households.

With aging societies, generational distances within families widen. As a result, elderly people often cannot pass on life experience. Although youth may seek advice from elders, decision-making power increasingly resides with middle-aged individuals. However, with improved health, it is conceivable that 80-year-olds in the future will be as active as today's 50-year-olds, potentially becoming key drivers of social development.

Yet if major decisions are made increasingly by older people, intergenerational inequality may worsen. Millennials already have less wealth and more debt than prior generations.

If influence is delayed further, upcoming generations risk becoming poorer and more marginalized.

The world may be on the verge of a third demographic transition, reshaping intergenerational relations and the family structure.

Population aging and rising life expectancy present challenges not only for pension systems, but also for healthcare. While modern medicine has reduced cardiovascular mortality across OECD countries (except Mexico), cancer — especially in the elderly — remains a major cause of death.

Over the past 20 years, deaths from neurological diseases (e.g., Parkinson's, Alzheimer's), and mental and behavioral disorders (e.g., dementia) have increased. These conditions are closely linked to aging. Experts anticipate that cognitive disorders will become the primary healthcare challenge in aging societies.

Russia's mortality profile is distinct. Despite a decline in cardiovascular-related deaths, they remain disproportionately high. Cancer mortality is lower than in developed countries, as is life expectancy — especially among men. Deaths from mental disorders remain around 1%. A key contributor to excess mortality in Russia is death from external causes (e.g., homicide, poisoning, alcohol abuse, traffic accidents). At 107.1 per 100,000 in 2023, Russia ranks lowest among both developed and many developing countries. Only the U.S. had comparable figures in 2021–2022 (94 per 100,000).

5,6 billion people
working-age population
will be in the world by 2030

The exhaustion of demographic potential forces states to pay more attention to healthcare

These global trends offer Russia an opportunity to act proactively. The Presidential Decree on increasing life expectancy makes it likely that Russia will face the same healthcare challenges as leading nations. Thus, reforms must begin now — including expansion of geriatric care, sanatoriums, and nursing homes. These will require significantly increased government spending.

Healthcare spending is closely tied to life expectancy. Modern assessments attribute 20% of population health outcomes to healthcare funding — though lifestyle and medical quality matter even more.

The COVID-19 pandemic starkly demonstrated the risks of underfunded, cost-focused healthcare. Many countries had cut “excess” capacity during stable periods. The crisis revealed the need for resilient, better-funded, and more coordinated healthcare systems — nationally and internationally.

Emerging trends now shape the healthcare systems of the future:

A shift toward person-centered care, including personalized medicine

Growing threats from unhealthy lifestyles, requiring a preventive focus

Integration of IT and AI into healthcare — from digital assistants and wearables to telemedicine

Expansion of medical data collection and analysis using AI for diagnostics

Adoption of VR/AR, bionic prosthetics, and neurotechnology

Demographic changes leading to greater demand for mental health services, reproductive care, and IVF


Rising demand for medical tourism and export of healthcare services

A new healthcare model must emphasize primary care — therapists and family doctors — with additional investment needed, especially in sparsely populated areas.

The rollout of new, personalized technologies and the development of care infrastructure for aging societies (the “silver economy”) will also require major investment.

Changing social structures and the second demographic transition are generating new diseases and needs. Governments must train more specialists in reproductive medicine, andrology, and geriatrics, invest in infrastructure, and revise state healthcare guarantees to expand access.

Structural reforms and greater healthcare funding will enable many countries to raise life expectancy to 78–80 years in the medium term.



By 2035, demographic shifts will radically alter the global labor and social landscape. The working-age population (15–64) will peak at 5.6 billion in 2030, then decline.

Growth in the U.S. working-age population has already fallen to <0.5% annually (from 2.5% in the 1970s). By 2030, labor shortages in developed countries could reach 50 million. Pension systems are strained – while in the 1950s there

were 12 workers per retiree, by 2035 there will be just two.

According to a 2023 McKinsey report, automation could replace up to 30% of industrial and 20% of service jobs by 2035. Key areas include logistics (70% of warehouse operations), accounting (50% of tasks), and retail (40% of cashier roles). Yet some jobs will remain hard to automate, and many sectors – particularly elder care – will

Figure 7 Projected Changes in Job Replacement by Machines by 2035



Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

face labor shortages. The ILO estimates that OECD countries alone will need 14 million new eldercare workers by 2035.

Governments are trying to boost birth rates through generous incentives or to fill labor gaps via immigration. However, the former yields limited gains, and the latter risks social unrest. Alternatives — such as robotization and raising retirement ages to 70 — are seen as temporary and insufficient.

Socially, workforce shortages will pose major challenges. The West has traditionally been a migration destination with moderately strict policies. By 2035, it will still need 50–70 million migrants, but immigration rules will tighten: mandatory language tests,

value assessments, and quotas for skilled labor.

In contrast, Asian countries will maintain strict policies, relying on internal reserves and high rates of automation. They may allow temporary migrants, but with no path to residency, and implement digital tracking systems (e.g., mobile geolocation).

Economic and climate pressures are accelerating migration — increasing tensions between the Global South and North. Without cooperation, conflicts will escalate. Global solutions must begin with regional initiatives covering not only migration, but also robotization, remote work quotas, data-sharing, and portable pension systems that follow migrants.

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1.5. Social Capital and Trust

Economic growth and improvements in quality of life — including progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) — now depend not only on the volume of resources deployed, but also on other factors. Chief among them is trust between economic actors, along with the development of social capital and public institutions.

Between 1980 and 2020, international surveys revealed substantial shifts in interpersonal trust levels. Northern European countries recorded the highest increases, while most African and Asian countries (except China) saw sharp declines. On average, across 122 countries, general trust indicators changed by 21%⁷ over the period.

In recent years, mounting conflicts and worsening economic conditions have triggered a global crisis of trust, hindering SDG progress and eroding public well-being. People increasingly feel a loss of control over their lives, and social institutions appear incapable of responding to climate, epidemiological, geopolitical, and economic threats. As a result, trust in government, NGOs, and the media has declined worldwide — especially among low-income groups⁸. Over the past 15 years, the share of people globally who believe that “most people can be trusted” has dropped by about 20%, reflecting a profound shift in societal perceptions.

In Russia, interpersonal trust has remained low for the past three

decades. According to a 2024 survey by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), only 24% of Russians expressed trust in others — and among youth aged 18–24, the figure was just 12%. This suggests a potential further decline in social trust. Russian society reflects a “narrow radius of trust” model — people tend to trust only a close circle of family and friends, while viewing outsiders with suspicion⁹. This pattern is common in societies that have experienced deep collective traumas due to natural disasters or social upheaval¹⁰.

Despite the challenges of recent decades, Russian society retains an unusually high level of optimism. People remain confident in their ability to overcome current difficulties and build a better future.

Global surveys show that only 36% of residents across 28 countries believe their children will live better lives (Edelman Trust Barometer)¹¹. In contrast, Russia stands out: according to VCIOM, 54% of Russians in late 2024 were optimistic about the next generation's prospects¹².

As with resource use, trust and social capital are increasingly critical for achieving economic growth, higher quality of life, and SDG targets.

Cultural homogenization and aggressive Westernization have produced a backlash — fueling traditionalist and anti-globalist

sentiments. Perceived loss of control and institutional ineffectiveness in the face of complex global threats have led to a widespread crisis of trust — particularly among low-income groups — toward governments, NGOs, and the media. The global share of people who believe “most people can be trusted” has fallen by ~20% over the past 15 years.

While institutional trust shapes interpersonal trust, it follows distinct patterns tied to different forms of social capital (norms, rules, values). In many countries, trust in governments dropped from 65% in 2020 to 52% in 2022; for media, from 56% to 50%. Meanwhile, trust in business remained nearly stable (62% to 61%).

This discrepancy has structural roots. Sanctions have increasingly become a tool for undermining political sovereignty. Since 2014, the number of targeted sanctions has grown 17-fold, with over a third motivated by political considerations. Sanctions are now imposed not only for international actions,

but for domestic ones as well — a practice that is fundamentally unjustified.

In Russia, however, trust in businesses, NGOs, the government, and media has increased. Yet a critical area of concern for policy-makers remains low trust in public services — particularly healthcare, education, the judiciary, and law enforcement. These institutions play a key role in shaping moral standards and societal health.

Trust reflects not only institutional effectiveness and policy outcomes, but also societal values and the level of solidarity. For Russians, the leading value is justice — broadly understood as equal access to healthcare, education, and decent employment. Poverty reduction and income inequality are seen as less central to justice.

In the coming decades, social trust will be shaped by opposing forces. On the one hand, the rise of the digital economy, socially oriented business models, stronger local solidarity, and collective

Figure 8 Projected Changes in the Effectiveness of International Institutions by 2035



Figure 9 Projected Changes in the Spiritual and Moral State of Society by 2035



Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

responses to external threats may help rebuild trust within communities. On the other hand, deepening inequality — especially due to labor market transformations from AI — will undermine both interpersonal trust and institutional legitimacy.

Climate change will pose a major challenge. Government failure to protect citizens from natural disasters and extreme weather will erode trust. Rising temperatures may fuel domestic aggression, and climate-driven migration may intensify feelings of injustice and interethnic tensions. Armed conflicts also worsen the social climate, reinforcing binary “us versus them” worldviews that gradually erode social trust.

An emerging threat is information warfare and digital echo chambers, which amplify polarization, fuel resentment, and entrench group-based prejudices.

As the state takes on a greater role in the economy and society, institutional trust becomes a cornerstone for interpersonal trust. As demonstrated by China, generalized interpersonal trust can be strengthened through trust in government as an enforcer of rules.

To transition toward a co-development and partnership economy, the state must adopt policies that foster trust:

Contractual trust — through digital transaction transparency, stable

“rules of the game,” and high reputational risk for bad actors;

Trust through cooperative experience — by promoting self-regulating professional and regional communities, teaching group collaboration and conflict resolution skills, improving access to higher education and upward mobility;

Shared destiny trust — by strengthening civic and human identity, supporting long-term thinking and social imagination, and fostering a positive vision of the future.

Today, employers enjoy greater public trust than most institutions — creating new opportunities to build social capital. Corporate social responsibility — especially when it involves employee participation in meaningful initiatives — becomes a key tool for sustaining optimism in society.

A particularly important area is building secure systems for sharing personal data to train AI algorithms. The most successful companies will be those that not only collect user data but also create transparent mechanisms for its use. These platforms will allow users and employees to knowingly share digital footprints to improve services — ultimately enhancing productivity and quality of life.

The rise of social trust may facilitate a shift toward a new balance between individual freedom and collective responsibility — a new model of solidarity.

1.6. Preserving Nature

Today, the level of resource use exceeds all reasonable limits — this is a global problem. Humanity's technological capabilities have reached a historic peak, yet many technologies pose serious risks to ecosystems and the future of civilization. Human economic activity has significantly damaged three-quarters of the Earth's land and two-thirds of its oceans, disrupting their natural ecosystems. This environmental imbalance is triggering ecological crises that humanity is still unable to fully mitigate.

At present, the world is facing a number of pressing environmental threats. The key concerns of the international community include:

1. Climate change driven by global warming. Power plants, transportation, and industrial facilities emit vast amounts of greenhouse gases, pushing emissions to a critical threshold and destabilizing the atmospheric balance. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that

geological and cosmic factors may outweigh anthropogenic effects. Addressing this uncertainty requires an effective system for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and absorption — a system that is only now beginning to take shape.

2. Industrial pollution of the environment — air, soil, and water bodies.

3. Ozone depletion and the emergence of ozone holes — a global concern. The ozone layer is vital to life on Earth, and its thinning threatens all of humanity. The main contributors to ozone destruction include industry, power plants, jet aircraft, and space vehicles.

4. Acid rain resulting from emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides. These toxic precipitations degrade soils and vegetation, stripping land of its fertile layer. This leads to large-scale desertification, loss of arable land, and fresh water sources.



Narendra Modi,

Prime Minister of India

"One Earth, One Family, One Future. This is not just a slogan. Today, we have all the means to produce enough to meet the basic needs of all people in the world. We no longer need to fight for survival; our era must not be an era of war!"

Environmental protection remains one of the most underperforming areas in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This challenge affects both developed and developing countries alike. According to the UN Secretary-General's report at the 16th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cali, October 2024), human activity has altered three-quarters of the world's land and about two-thirds of its oceans, causing significant negative changes in most of the planet's ecosystems.

Today's agri-food system has become the primary driver of biodiversity loss. Unsustainable land-use practices continue to destroy natural ecosystems. According to a McKinsey study, livestock farming accounts for 53% of terrestrial biodiversity loss, crop cultivation for 32%, and other agricultural sectors for the remaining 15%. Over the past 50 years, the situation has reached a critical point. The Living Planet Index — tracking 35,000 populations across 5,500 species — declined by 73% between 1970 and 2021. The

situation is especially dire in fresh-water ecosystems, where the index has fallen by 85%.

If current trends continue, the world could approach an ecological point of no return by 2030. This would require urgent measures to reduce human pressure on the environment, including restrictions on economic activity across significant land and ocean areas. Substantially greater investments may be needed than those provided under the Global Biodiversity Framework adopted in 2022, which calls for protecting at least 30% of terrestrial, inland water, coastal, and marine areas by 2030, and restoring at least 30% of degraded ecosystems — requiring \$200 billion annually.

According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), economic losses from weather- and climate-related disasters are rising rapidly. Between 1970 and 2021, total damages amounted to \$4.3 trillion. Over one-third of that — \$1.5 trillion — occurred between 2010 and 2019, highlighting the accelerating pace of environmental destruction.

Figure 10 Future Outlook for Environmental and Climate Dynamics by 2035



Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

Projected Climate Migration by 2030:

1.2 Billion People

Annual losses have increased from \$86 billion (1970–2021 average) to over \$280 billion during 2021–2024 (Swiss Re estimates). This trend is driven by the growing frequency of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, and droughts — each causing at least \$1 billion in damage. According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), there were on average 16 major natural disasters per five-year period in the 1980s, 28 in the 1990s, 34 in the 2000s, 66 in the 2010s, and 115 during 2020–2024. From 1980 to 2000, fewer than 100 million people were affected; in 2001–2024, that number exceeded 200 million. This escalation is partly due to increasing population density in areas once considered safe for economic activity.

These alarming trends are only partially driven by climate change. The root causes remain economic growth, population increase, and rapid urbanization. Paradoxically, despite rising insurance costs, the gap between economic losses and insured damages continues to widen. In 2000–2009, this gap stood at \$110 billion. In 2010–2020, it rose to \$136 billion. Recent years show even sharper growth: \$155 billion in 2022 and

\$174 billion in 2023 — stark evidence of the global economy's mounting vulnerability to natural disasters.

Two additional global trends merit attention. First, the relative economic damage from disasters has stabilized at around 0.5% of global GDP, thanks in large part to well-developed insurance systems in OECD countries. There, roughly 40% of assets at risk from fire, flooding, and earthquakes are insured — primarily residential buildings and agricultural crops. As a result, OECD countries have managed to limit disaster losses to 0.3% of their collective GDP. In developing nations, including Russia, the situation is far more precarious. Insurance coverage remains significantly lower, and public financing for disaster preparedness is insufficient. Consequently, economic losses often exceed 0.5% of GDP.

Small and island nations are at particular risk: in these vulnerable economies, disaster damage can exceed 5% of GDP. International initiatives — including the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2025) — have provided support to developing countries. A key success has been the reduction in disaster-related fatalities, made possible by early warning systems and improved national emergency response mechanisms.

Water has always been — and will remain — a critical resource for humanity. Yet it is still undervalued, despite its essential role in

economic growth and ecosystem resilience. Environmental quality and human life are directly linked to water. Global water demand has surged. According to the World Economic Forum (2024), global freshwater withdrawals per capita have increased more than 7.5-fold over the past 30 years, reaching 4.3 trillion cubic meters annually (70% for agriculture, 20% for industry, 10% for municipal use).

In most countries, water availability is steadily declining. In 2023, 25 nations — primarily India — home to a quarter of the world's population, faced extreme water stress. These countries now withdraw more than 80% of their available renewable water resources each year, posing a serious threat to sustainable water supply. The world's two largest economies — China and the U.S. — also face moderate to high water stress: China uses around 20% of its water resources, the U.S. up to 40%. China's per capita water availability halved between 1964 and 2020. At the same time, surging consumption, pollution, and declining water quality are degrading river and freshwater ecosystems, sharply reducing biodiversity. This threatens both human safety and economic activity.

The global water crisis is also becoming a source of political tension, sparking disputes over access and control. Since the 2000s, water-related conflicts have more than doubled — especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and West Asia.

If this trend continues, the economic consequences will be global. The World Economic Forum (2024) projects that by 2050, high-income countries could lose 8% of GDP on average, while low-income countries may lose 10–15%.

International experts highlight several priority areas for reducing water-related risks. Chief among them is a systemic approach to water governance — incorporating comprehensive assessments and full-cycle hydrological planning. This requires new strategies for resource use and ecosystem protection based on the concept of the complete hydrological cycle — and a new level of scientific research. Water pricing must also reflect its true value, providing incentives for closed-loop water systems and freshwater ecosystem conservation. Sustainable water use should be based on basin-level cooperation, guided by systems thinking. This will require targeted financing from diverse sources. In parallel, adaptive water management is essential — including risk mitigation tools for water scarcity and mechanisms for balancing demand and avoiding user conflicts. It is also critical to integrate water policy with technological and organizational innovations.

Developing countries are increasingly using aggressive rhetoric to gain access to resources

Green technologies encompass a wide range of engineering solutions, equipment, and recycling methods aimed at reducing environmental impact. They help cut pollution and carbon emissions, optimize resource use, and improve efficiency across all sectors of the economy. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) emphasizes clean energy technologies — including renewables, energy-saving systems, and innovations for efficient energy production and consumption. In energy, this includes renewable energy and conservation technologies. In utilities and urban infrastructure, smart systems manage lighting, heating, cooling, and water supply. Agriculture employs automated systems for microclimate control, irrigation, animal feeding, precision farming, and waste-to-energy conversion. For instance,

grain losses — representing 70% of global caloric intake — amount to \$60 billion annually, a figure that can be reduced through moisture sensors and modern grain agitators. The services sector also benefits: smart data centers optimize information processing, while digital and telecom solutions transform healthcare, making medical services more accessible and effective.

To avert a global environmental crisis — including climate change, water scarcity, rising waste volumes, and biodiversity loss — coordinated international action and partnership-based environmental projects are essential. Introducing environmental compensation mechanisms should promote sustainable development — without violating WTO free trade principles or erecting new barriers for developing economies.

Opportunities for Cooperation and the Outlook for the Future World

Solidarity, rather than traditional interstate rivalry, may offer a solution to the growing economic instability caused by the crisis of the unipolar globalization model. Today's world requires a reassessment of outdated paradigms based on narrowly defined national interests. A shift toward cooperation and collective responsibility for key global processes could provide a sustainable alternative to the existing global system.

2.1. A New Global Economy of Co-Development and Partnership

Overcoming the current structural crisis of the global economy will require more than piecemeal tariff agreements. What is needed is the establishment of a new, long-term, and stable international framework for regulating trade, finance, and innovation-driven technological relations.

Building a multipolar world of co-operation — rather than chaos — requires Russia's active and responsible participation as one of the key players. Without it, resolving the challenges not only of Eurasia but of the world as a whole will be impossible.

The BRICS group can become a platform for developing a new

concept of sustainable development. This association of five rapidly growing economies is already demonstrating a shared commitment to the green agenda. As seen in the outcomes of the last six summits, BRICS is playing an increasingly prominent role in the global transition toward sustainability. The emerging system will be multipolar but rooted in the principles of collective responsibility for the planet's future.

Within the UN framework, BRICS may propose a global co-development initiative — or a set of initiatives — aimed at reducing conflict among key countries, dismantling tariff and non-tariff barriers, curbing unfair



Xi Jinping,

President of the People's Republic of China

"In the face of risks and threats, we must act together. To build small circles or start a new Cold War, or to foster ideological divides and bloc confrontations, will only push the world into division and hinder global development."

competition, safeguarding the interests of least-developed countries, and maintaining long-term development benchmarks. A series of international negotiations should be organized not only bilaterally but also multilaterally, involving regional integration groups such as BRICS, the SCO, the EAEU, MERCOSUR and other Latin American alliances, and ASEAN. Agreements on tariff and non-tariff issues should be accompanied by adjustments to voting power within international development institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.) to reflect the increased global share of developing economies.

Countries of the Global South and Asia must move from passive rejection of Western sanctions to active opposition against measures not endorsed by the United Nations. While many states formally comply with secondary sanctions imposed on Russia, Belarus, and Iran, what is needed going forward is coordinated resistance to restrictive policies. Without dismantling sanction-based dominance in global trade and finance, the construction of a fair co-development

system will remain out of reach.

Regional associations in the Global South and Eurasia still lag significantly behind the EU in terms of integration and cohesion. Their immediate task is institutional strengthening. For BRICS, establishing a permanent executive body — while preserving national sovereignty — could be a meaningful step. The SCO must accelerate its transformation from a security-focused structure into a full-fledged economic bloc. Gradual expansion of these organizations by incorporating observers and dialogue partners could amplify their global influence — provided internal consolidation and improved governance are prioritized.

BRICS and SCO members should shift their focus from sanctions and trade barriers toward establishing mutually beneficial preferential regimes and developing special economic zones.

International trade remains a key driver of economic growth for the vast majority of nations, ensuring its central role in shaping a multipolar world.

New economic alliances will be created primarily to enhance sanction resistance — either through scale or by securing control over critical assets such as technology, transport corridors, and energy systems. Countries will integrate into these new alliances in different ways: some will align their development strategies fully with a particular bloc, while others will adopt a selective approach, connecting specific sectors to different centers of power.

By 2035, a multi-tiered system of global trade may emerge. Western countries will likely maintain leadership but will continue fierce competition among themselves and with the rest of the world — increasingly through tight control over technology dissemination. At the same time, a stable belt of solidarity could form, comprising

two to three regional associations. Over the next decade, these alliances may build enough experience coordinating goals and implementing joint initiatives to serve as viable alternatives. Some countries, however, will remain outside both the Western bloc and emerging regional alliances for various reasons.

Today, nearly all new product markets immediately become global. This calls for the development of international standards that both prevent monopolization and promote open access on one hand, and guard against sanctions and manipulations on the other. Establishing the rules of global markets will be another cornerstone of the new global trade model. Critical markets for economic growth today include food, energy, and technology.

Regional Economic Integration



Common Currencies and Settlement Systems



Harmonization of Tariffs and Taxes



Harmonization of Technical and Social Standards



Production Infrastructure and Energy Grids



Transport Corridors



Digital Platforms and Supply Chains



Collective Infrastructure to Counter Sanctions



Protection Against Military and Cyber Threats, and Illegal Migration

The core elements of the regional economic model include: shared currencies or payment systems, joint infrastructure (transport corridors, energy grids, digital platforms), regulatory coordination (harmonized taxation, environmental standards, labor norms), collective security, and joint measures against sanctions, cyberthreats, and migration crises.

At the foundation of this model should be cross-border payment systems using multilateral clearing and a conditional settlement unit in the form of a shared digital currency. Conversion into national currencies on domestic markets would be guaranteed by the central banks of participating countries.

Using a unified digital currency platform would significantly outperform traditional payment systems in terms of transaction speed, reliability, confidentiality, cost efficiency, independence, and parity among participants. It would also ensure protection from "third-country" sanctions.

Mutual settlements based on a conditional settlement unit with transparent valuation principles would minimize currency risks. This approach — combining market adaptability with stable exchange ratios relative to national currencies — could secure fair conditions for trade. Building trust in the unit requires a mechanism to back issued obligations, similar to classical stablecoin models. A key requirement is full backing of the settlement unit with protective assets serving as value stabilizers. Not only must this backing be declared, but actual convertibility must also be guaranteed through the presence of adequate reserves.

This international mutual settlement system would require a high degree of coordination among the central banks of participating nations. After all, a "community of shared destiny" cannot exist without a "community of shared currency" linking national monetary systems into a multi-level currency framework.

2.2. Global Energy Initiative

The growth of the global economy — particularly in developing countries — will largely depend on the balance between increasing energy consumption and the transition to energy-efficient technologies that meet environmental and climate-related requirements.

According to estimates by the VEB Institute, global energy consumption may increase by more than 40% between 2023 and 2050. India and Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to be the primary growth drivers due to their demographic potential and accelerated economic development. Their share of global energy consumption is projected to rise from 8% in 2022 to 17% by 2050. These two regions represent the core growth potential for expanding Russian energy exports, including petrochemical and gas chemical products.

With its powerful and diverse energy sector, Russia is well positioned to remain a key global supplier of affordable and stable energy resources — both today and

in the long term. According to the Energy Institute, Russia ranks fourth globally in terms of primary energy consumption (following China, the United States, and India) and third in combined oil, gas, and coal production, behind only China and the United States. While the production structures of the U.S. (27% oil, 41% gas, 32% coal) and Russia (26% oil, 35% gas, 39% coal) are relatively similar, China relies on coal for nearly 95% of its production. In Saudi Arabia — ranked fourth in hydrocarbon production — oil accounts for 80% and gas for 20%. Russia ranked 15th in the world in per capita primary energy consumption in 2023, indicating considerable potential for future growth.

Russia's main prospects for oil production lie in hard-to-reach regions — Siberia, the Arctic, and the northern offshore shelf. While current proven reserves will last nearly 30 years, economically viable fields may be exhausted within 20 years. Continued development of exploration and extraction technologies will



Matthias Otte,

Professor at Worms University of Applied Sciences (Germany)

"Current 'green' policy often results in bureaucracy and certificates. Truly sustainable production is local and driven by small and medium-sized enterprises. Renewables alone cannot provide a stable base load. Wind turbines are already widespread, solar potential is limited. We still need gas, oil, and nuclear energy. Without a pragmatic shift, this will not be achievable."

be essential to unlock the full potential of these territories and expand Russia's oil map.

Today, global oil and gas markets are undergoing a profound transformation driven less by economics than by geopolitics — particularly the EU's policy of phasing out Russian energy imports. However, a shift in the balance toward the United States poses serious risks. Despite current production leadership, the U.S. ranks only 12th in proven oil reserves, which at current extraction rates would last only five years. This forces Washington to pursue an aggressive energy policy that prioritizes national security over market stability.

Most experts agree that Russia's influence in the global oil industry is unlikely to diminish in the near future — despite international sanctions and claims of “depleting” reserves. For Russia, it is critical not only to maintain a stable niche in the oil market but also to create conditions for the development of adjacent sectors and high value-added industries. Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves — approximately 20% of global total — and ranks second globally in production, accounting for 14.4% of world output. Its gas reserves are sufficient for more than 80 years.

At the same time, the U.S. strategy to dominate the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market carries hidden risks. With proven reserves lasting less than 15 years, the U.S. may soon face a dilemma: either a domestic gas shortage or

underutilized LNG plants. Russia must seize the current window of opportunity to expand its LNG projects — while remaining mindful of high technological, logistical, market (e.g., expected LNG price drops), and sanctions-related risks.

Despite the boom in green energy sources, coal will remain one of the world's key fuels for at least the next 5–10 years. Coal has the highest share (47%) in the energy balance of rapidly growing Asia-Pacific countries, which account for 44% of global energy consumption. It also plays a significant role in electricity generation in Africa (22%) and the CIS (14%). Russia holds 15.1% of global coal reserves — enough to meet demand for more than 400 years — and accounts for 4.8% of global coal production, ranking sixth worldwide. Although China produces far more coal, its reserves are projected to last only 37 years, supporting sustained import demand and providing Russia with an opportunity to expand exports.

The share of China, India, South-east Asia, and the Middle East in global coal consumption is expected to continue growing. However, the trend toward phasing out coal will be more pronounced in countries with low economic growth prospects, limited electricity demand, and small coal reserves. In fast-growing economies, coal will increasingly be designated as a backup fuel. Overall, global energy consumption will gradually shift toward cleaner sources, especially gas, while coal use is expected to decline more sharply after 2038.

In this context, Russia has significant potential to expand its share of global gas and coal markets at least until 2036. In the oil sector, however — where competition is especially intense — growth in physical export volumes is likely only until 2030.

The progressive development of both global and Russian energy systems requires the removal of restrictions on energy technologies and the strengthening of international alliances. Key steps should include lifting sanctions on energy-saving technologies and developing integration frameworks — including existing structures like

OPEC+ and potentially new ones, such as a gas-oriented counterpart to OPEC.

Efforts to consolidate gas exporters — particularly with Iran and Qatar — should be resumed. The creation of a common Eurasian energy market could become a key priority for the SCO. In partnership with OPEC and major gas-producing countries, a new initiative — “Energy for Development” — could be launched, aimed at ensuring affordable energy supplies for developing economies and legal protection for Eurasian energy companies and equipment manufacturers.

Global Energy Initiative

The economic growth of countries — particularly developing ones — largely depends on access to energy. It is essential to increase energy production and improve energy efficiency, taking into account environmental and climate requirements. The conditions for the progressive development of both the global and Russian energy sectors include the free dissemination of energy and energy-saving technologies, as well as the fine-tuning of regional energy integration alliances. This entails:

- Protection of global supply chains for energy resources, international infrastructure facilities, and energy engineering equipment.
- The creation of alternative commodity exchanges and financial instruments to minimize financial speculation.

2.3. Global Food Security Initiative

By a certain milestone — estimated at 2035–2040 — humanity must fully resolve the problem of hunger. The world is significantly behind schedule in achieving the Sustainable Development Goal “Zero Hunger” (SDG 2). Global undernourishment surged during the COVID-19 pandemic and has remained virtually unchanged for the past three years. In 2023, between 713 and 757 million people suffered from hunger — one in every eleven globally and one in five in Africa. On average, between 2021 and 2023, the number of undernourished people was 284 million in Africa, 385.2 million in Asia, and 43.4 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. While hunger in Africa continues to rise, it remains stable in Asia and is decreasing notably in Latin America and the Caribbean.

According to forecasts by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the goal of zero hunger will not be met by 2030¹³. At that point, the number of undernourished people may fall to 581.7 million globally, but rise to 308 million in Africa, drop to 229 million in Asia, and decrease to 33.7 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. The world produces enough food, but about one-third is lost or wasted. The causes of hunger are socioeconomic, rooted in poverty and inefficient food distribution.

Daily per capita calorie consumption and dietary structure vary significantly across global regions.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, per capita consumption is only about two-thirds of that in North America. This highlights the need to reduce global nutritional inequality and suggests considerable growth potential in many regions.

Food and livestock consumption is projected to grow due to global population increase and rising per capita incomes. Asia will remain the main driver of global food demand. In this region, income growth will spur demand for meat, fish, and other high-value-added food products, accounting for roughly half of the overall increase in consumption — a shift that will influence global food trends.

In middle-income countries, the shift away from cereals and legumes — characteristic of high-income countries — will continue, while animal-based food consumption will rise rapidly. In low-income countries, cereals and legumes will remain the primary source of calories. In high-income countries, saturated consumption levels will lead to per capita declines in most food categories. In North America, daily calorie intake per person is expected to drop by 1.6% by 2033. The lowest growth rates in calorie consumption will be seen in Africa and the Middle East, while the highest will be in South and Southeast Asia. Despite a general global increase in consumption, regional disparities will persist through 2033.

13. FAO defines hunger as a condition in which people do not consume enough food to meet the minimum daily energy requirements (MDER). To establish hunger thresholds, FAO uses the concept of the Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER), measured in kilocalories per person per day for specific age and sex groups. This indicator represents the level of energy intake from food deemed sufficient to meet energy needs for maintaining a minimum acceptable body weight, achieving expected growth, leading a healthy lifestyle, and engaging in light physical activity. For the population as a whole, the MDER is calculated as a weighted average of the minimum energy requirements across different age and sex groups. In the baseline period (2021–2023), the average daily per capita calorie intake exceeded the MDER (2023) in all country groups.

Figure 11 Projected Changes in Global Inequality and Migration by 2035**Figure 12 Projected Changes in Food Production Instability and Hunger by 2035**

● Will Improve

● Will Worsen

Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

Efforts to ensure regular access to safe and nutritious food for all have slowed significantly. For the third consecutive year, the share of the global population facing moderate or severe food insecurity has held steady — around 28.9% in 2023, affecting 2.33 billion people. Latin America remains a rare bright spot of progress.

Progress in eliminating all forms of malnutrition has been limited. While rates of stunting and wasting in children under five have declined and exclusive breastfeeding rates have improved, there has been no reduction in low birth weight or childhood overweight. Worse, anemia in women aged 15–49 has increased. At present, the world is not on track to meet any of the seven global nutrition targets by 2030.

Despite critical food needs in the poorest countries, discriminatory trade measures remain widespread — especially against Russia. According to the Global Trade Alert database, from January 1,

2022, to May 13, 2025, 5,130 restrictive measures were introduced on agricultural products, food, and fertilizers — compared to just 1,288 supportive ones¹⁴.

Non-tariff barriers (e.g., payment issues, insurance, and phytosanitary regulations) and food market volatility have worsened, compounded by logistical disruptions. These barriers increase business costs and divert resources away from food supply growth, price reduction, and job creation — undermining production efficiency and food affordability.

As a major player in the global food (especially grain) market, Russia could serve as a resource integrator and operator for countries participating in the Global Food Security Platform. It could also pursue regional partnerships through direct food supply agreements. To support emergency humanitarian logistics, a specialized fleet should be created with a status equivalent to that of the Red Cross mission. A

14. Author's calculations based on Global Trade Alert data. URL: <https://clck.ru/3MZozy>

Table 8 Food Availability by World Region

Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER), 2023, kcal/person/day		Daily Calorie Intake per Person (Food Availability), kcal/person/day		Growth Rate, %		Calorie Intake to MDER Ratio, %
		2021–2023	2033	2033/2020	–2022	2021–2023/MDER
World	1834	World	2868	2995	104,4	156,4
North America	1963	North America	3815	3753	98,4	194,3
Latin America and the Caribbean	1858	Latin America and the Caribbean	2979	3101	104,1	160,3
Europe	1931	Europe and Central Asia	3311	3409	103,0	171,5
West Asia and North Africa	1822	Middle East and North Africa	2844	2899	101,9	156,1
East and Southeast Asia	1867	Developed East Asia	3151	3296	104,6	168,8
Central and South Asia	1796	South and Southeast Asia	2541	2810	110,6	141,5
Sub-Saharan Africa	1724	Sub-Saharan Africa	2321	2396	103,2	134,6

Source: FAO, *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI)*

Table 9. Assessment of Global Food Security Indicators

	Population facing acute food insecurity, million people	Population facing moderate or severe food insecurity, million people	Prevalence of wasting among children under 5, %	Prevalence of stunting among children under 5, %	Prevalence of overweight among children under 5, %	Prevalence of obesity among adults (18+), %	Prevalence of anemia among women (15–49 years), %	Exclusive breast-feeding rate (0–5 months), %	Prevalence of low birth weight, %
World	2021–2023	2021–2023	2022	2022	2022	2022	2019	2022	2020
	868,6	2311,7	6,8	22,3	5,6	15,8	29,9	48,0	14,7
2030	-	-	6,2	19,5	5,7	19,8	32,3	59,0	14,2
Required Progress to Meet 2030 Target (relative to baseline)	0	0	3,0	13,5	3,0	15,8	14,3	70,0	10,5

Data Sources: 1. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, WHO. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World – 2024. Financing SDG2: End hunger, food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition*. Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254ru>

2. OECD/FAO (2024). *OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2024–2033*. <https://doi.org/10.1787/4c5d2cfb-en>

3. FAOSTAT

Global Food Security Initiative

Although the world produces sufficient food, approximately one-third of it is lost. The root causes of hunger are socio-economic: poverty and inefficient food distribution. Therefore, it is important not only to expand production, but also to improve the efficiency of the global food market. The following initiatives are needed:

- Emergency food interventions to provide urgent humanitarian assistance and mitigate factors that threaten global food security (such as crop failures, armed conflicts, and epidemics). This could include the establishment of international food reserves, with operators equipped with the necessary infrastructure for storage and multimodal transportation.
- The development of local markets and technologies, as well as enhanced training of personnel in the agricultural sector (agribusiness). This would increase the efficiency of local producers and processors, including through the creation of joint ventures.
- Protection of global supply chains for food, fertilizers, and other agricultural products.

- The creation of alternative commodity exchanges and financial instruments to minimize financial speculation.
- Tariff and other preferences for food trade.

A key tool for promoting regional integration could be a collective food security agreement. International cooperation in veterinary and sanitary fields must also be strengthened to enable effective and timely responses to transboundary animal diseases and plant epidemics. It is advisable to advance systemic mechanisms for the prompt recognition of regionalization in agriculture, which would simplify market access for producers and enhance the resilience of agribusiness value chains. In turn, these value chains will support the continuity of value creation. Simultaneously, cooperation in the standardization of agricultural production should be expanded. It is also important to accurately reflect the contribution of agribusiness to climate change. Decisions should be made with the active participation of national businesses, which must have a voice in the process.

672 million people

the number of hungry people
in the world by 2024

key driver of regional integration could be a collective food security agreement.

Efforts should also focus on improving not only production but also food processing, waste management, and the depth of processing for extracted and cultivated resources (e.g., fish, aquaculture), addressing the needs of both the agri-food sector and consumers. The supply of high value-added processed products to international markets should complement, not replace, existing exports — expanding product availability and improving consumer conditions.

It is also necessary to reassess the role and potential of existing multilateral institutions (FAO, WFP, international commodity organizations, IFAD, etc.), including better coordination and a division of labor. A dedicated action plan should be developed to harness these institutions' potential to support national businesses and investment initiatives.

Stabilizing international agricultural markets also requires reintegrating sectoral formats that bring

together major exporters and importers under an Integrated UN Program for Food Products — modeled after the UN's Integrated Commodity Program of the 1970s–1980s.

Partnerships in agricultural education and workforce training are essential. This should involve digital tools, lifelong learning, human capital development programs, and other educational strategies.

Veterinary and sanitary cooperation must also be strengthened to ensure effective responses to transboundary livestock and crop diseases. It is important to establish swift regional recognition systems for market access, helping maintain stable value chains in the agri-food sector. Cooperation in standards and climate impact reporting must also evolve, with national businesses actively involved in decision-making.

Finally, discussions should begin on a new international trade agreement to limit unjustified trade restrictions on agricultural products — including “green protectionism.” It is essential to encourage the development of food production capacity (processing, storage, logistics) in key developing-country importers. Moreover, there is a need to restore local food traditions. In several African countries, the promotion of foreign food preferences has exacerbated hunger due to increased imports of poorly produced goods¹⁵. There is strong potential for increased Russian fertilizer exports, cooperation in soil fertility, and joint development of livestock farming.

15. Andrae G. Beckman B. *The wheat trap. Bread and Underdevelopment in Nigeria.* Sweden. Upsala. 1985.

2.4. The Logistics and Communication Initiative

Expanding mutual trade by increasing the complementarity of goods flows and developing new transport and logistics routes could become a powerful driver of economic growth. A positive effect would result from removing infrastructure constraints, reducing fiscal, administrative, and technical barriers to cargo transportation by all modes of transport, and harmonizing transport legislation.

Both Russia and its partners require the establishment of a new Eurasian system of transport corridors, the enhancement of the North–South corridor, the operational rollout of the Iran–Russia ferry route, the integration of India’s, Indonesia’s, and Vietnam’s cargo bases into EAEU corridors, and the strategic use of Russia’s geographic position to provide transit routes (the Northern Sea Route, Baikal-Amur Mainline, Trans-Siberian Railway, etc.) that facilitate trade among friendly countries. Proven practices such as the Agroexpress initiative should be supported and scaled up.

An important element of integration is the formation of a single air transport market and the creation of a so-called

Eurasian Sky, including joint airlines, particularly in the cargo segment.

One of the most environmentally promising and currently underutilized modes of transport is inland water transport. In the long term, the construction of a large European water ring could serve as a model for implementing integration projects between the EAEU and its partners in the field of transport.

The development of a new Eurasian transport infrastructure could include projects that connect the railway systems of Russia, China, Iran, and African countries. A key component of such an integrated network could be a high-speed railway project connecting Urumqi (China) – Astana (Kazakhstan) – Yekaterinburg – Kazan – Moscow – Saint Petersburg (Russia) – Minsk (Belarus), serving both passenger and high-value freight transport. This would represent a global trans-Eurasian high-speed transport initiative. As relations with European countries normalize, the project could be organically extended westward. Such network integration of Eurasian transport systems would enhance their speed, capacity, and reliability.

2.5. The Knowledge Economy and Space Exploration Partnership Initiative

Russia continues to conduct large-scale fundamental scientific research in the field of physics through megascience facilities, with broad international participation from scientists in developing countries. Despite sanctions, it has maintained communication with the Western scientific community. Fundamental science overall remains a sphere of unified cooperation, despite attempts at fragmentation and isolation.

One of the key directions of scientific and technological development in the coming years will be digitalization. In the context of the regionalization of the global economy, a trend is emerging toward the creation of independent national digital industrial platforms. For Russia, this presents an opportunity to occupy niches as an independent provider of ICT solutions, including in "sensitive" sectors. Given the conflictual nature of global economic regionalization, the market volume for alternative digital solutions may be substantial.

An important area of partnership—especially with BRICS countries and the Global South—remains education, where Russia retains high levels of expertise.

In recent years, space activity has become a powerful and dynamic sector of the global economy, characterized by increasing competition among both state

and private actors. Alongside the United States and Russia, China and India have emerged as leaders in the space race, surpassing European countries.

Despite growing commercialization, space remains an area of relatively broad international cooperation. While near-Earth space, especially low Earth orbits, has become the domain of predominantly national projects, deep space—including Moon and Mars exploration—requires joint efforts by the international community. The United States and Europe, through the European Space Agency, actively engage in joint space missions. Russia also has considerable experience in cooperating with them. However, space cooperation within BRICS remains underdeveloped.

The International Space Station (ISS) continues to be a multinational project, with its operation expected to conclude by 2030. The United States has launched the Artemis lunar program, attracting many new international participants. The Mars exploration program is also expected to have a multinational character, where Russia could contribute through its "Nuclon" project. This Russian initiative aims to develop a space complex equipped with a nuclear-powered propulsion system of the megawatt class. The project's goal is to provide efficient and long-term energy supply for interplanetary missions,

including the exploration of the Moon and distant planets in the solar system.

At present, international space projects merely

supplement national ones and are predominantly promoted by Western actors. BRICS countries have yet to establish a framework for joint space initiatives.

Global Space Initiative

A qualitative shift in the regulation of national activities in space can be achieved through the affirmation of space sovereignty for all states. It is crucial to avoid a scenario in which certain countries are deprived of access to space. To this end, several key objectives must be addressed:

- Ensuring fair access to orbits and space resources, including the allocation of quotas, compliance, reallocation, inspections, sanctions, on-orbit operations, and the provision of international transit corridors for deep space launches, satellite deployment, and related activities.
- Limiting the militarization of space.
- Implementing programs to combat space debris.
- Developing regulatory standards for satellite internet, including restrictions on interference with other terrestrial services, prohibitions on censorship and surveillance, and bans on the unilateral disconnection of users.
- Establishing a moratorium on private ownership of celestial bodies until appropriate regulations are developed.

2.6. Environmental Partnership

Experts identify five key areas for overcoming the environmental crisis.

The first is the technological track. It involves the development of environmentally friendly industries and equipment, as well as the improvement of technological processes.

The second is the economic track. Its main objective is to make environmental protection economically beneficial for producers. This can be achieved by introducing tax incentives for the use of clean production technologies and improving emission treatment systems.

The third is the administrative track. Liability for violations of environmental regulations should be increased, and enforcement mechanisms for compliance with environmental law should be strengthened.

The fourth is the educational track. A new approach to environmental education is needed—one that aims to transform the consumerist attitude toward nature and combines systemic action with mass outreach.

The fifth track is based on the principle of a mass, collective approach to solving global environmental problems. Since no single country can eliminate the environmental crisis alone, the efforts of the entire global community must be united—including Russia,

which accounts for one-sixth of the world's land area.

Adaptation is a key strategy for reducing the risks and damages caused by climate change. While mitigation—the reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions, including anthropogenic emissions and the absorption of carbon by land and ocean ecosystems—remains important, it cannot fully resolve the problem. Moreover, for national economies, especially in developing countries and specific regions with populations that bear a disproportionate burden of climate impacts, adaptation is often more effective and beneficial than mitigation. This is because the benefits of adaptation are felt locally by the population and economy, whereas the benefits of mitigation (even with full participation and investment by all major countries) accrue globally—and unevenly across nations.

Functionally and substantively, adaptation programs and measures are closely linked to, and often form an integral part of, broader strategies aimed at reducing losses and damage from weather- and climate-related emergencies. The most effective investments are in systems for efficient water management, multi-hazard early warning systems, and climate services. According to UN estimates, every \$1 spent on these measures yields \$4 in benefits globally. Increasing front-loaded investments in resilient infrastructure by just

3% reduces disaster recovery and damage costs by \$4–6 per \$1 invested. In European countries, the cost-benefit ratio for the above-mentioned risk-reduction systems reaches \$9–11 per

\$1 spent—roughly 1.5 to 2 times higher than the return on other adaptation measures, such as enhancing infrastructure or crop resilience to drought, due to their greater capital intensity.

2.7. Partnership in Healthcare

Russia, together with its BRICS partners, can and should coordinate efforts to preserve public health and jointly counter epidemics and biological threats. It is essential to expand cooperation in R\&D in the field of medicine and to promote mutual exchange of medical technologies and knowledge, as well as to support training and mobility of Eurasian healthcare professionals.

A potential foundation for such a partnership could be a network of international medical centers (or alliances) and joint medical teams,

ensuring continuous exchange of treatment technologies and coordinated pandemic response efforts. To facilitate this “partnership for life,” a preferential regime for issuing digital visas (or health visas) could be introduced. Additionally, within the framework of BRICS or the SCO, it may be possible to launch a joint program for medical research and the development of nature-inspired technologies, backed by appropriate funding and informational support. This could include agreed rules for cross-border data exchange and the formation of shared databases.

77 years

projected life
expectancy
by 2050

2.8. Democracy and National Political Sovereignty

By 2035, traditional Western-style democracy will undergo profound transformation under the influence of three key factors. First, the effectiveness of sanctions policy as a geopolitical tool against major powers will decline. However, for other countries, including those outside regional blocs, the risk of being subjected to sanctions may increase. Second, political processes will become increasingly dependent on digital technologies. Third, the growing importance of regional associations will necessitate the recognition that there are diverse models of social organization and that democracy is not limited to the liberal variety. Resistance to politically motivated sanctions is expected to intensify.

The development of political systems resilient to sanction pressure will occur in parallel with the formation of economic blocs capable of providing a stable foundation for the preservation of sovereignty. The resilience of political systems to sanctions will be shaped by several critical factors. First, the quality of technologies

available for managing and accounting for human capital. Second, the reliability of electoral systems and mechanisms for recording citizens' will, which ensure the legitimacy of political processes. Third, the ability to protect national political leaders from political, economic, and digital sanctions—such as being cut off from critical services, cyberattacks, or targeted information operations. Technologies designed to bolster resilience to external pressure can be developed and implemented within regional blocs united by shared political goals and values.

Russia, having faced unprecedented sanctions pressure in the history of the global economy, is emerging as a key partner for all those who value genuine sovereignty—a proven and reliable ally. It is not merely participating in international transactions but is actively supporting its partners in defending their interests by offering legal, technological, and diplomatic solutions that have already demonstrated their effectiveness.

Sanctions have become a means of influencing the political sovereignty of Western countries' opponents

2.9. Values-Based Co-Development and Humanitarian Integration

Without the development of cultural and spiritual ties and a shared value system, it is difficult—if not impossible—to build sustainable cooperation between states and peoples. Achieving deeper mutual understanding requires expanding contacts across various fields, including education, science, culture, and sports. At both the governmental and civil society levels, it is essential to foster support for a value system and a set of measures that motivate people to strengthen solidarity, tolerance, openness, and respect for history, culture, and traditions across the Greater Eurasian Partnership, with the aim of deepening intercultural, interethnic, interfaith, and interstate cooperation.

The development model that Russia can offer its partners is founded on two fundamental principles: care for nature as a core cultural and civilizational value, and the development of human potential as the basis for sustainable progress.

This implies that Russia must have its own agenda—one that is attractive to the external world—including effective approaches in the fields of economic development, technology, and security.

Russia has the potential to become a northern hub in shaping a global information and cultural space, drawing on both its contemporary achievements in the arts and the rich historical and cultural heritage of its peoples. A key element of Russia's cultural code is the deeply ingrained practice of living in peace—united in the diversity of its peoples, languages, and cultures. This fusion, like Damascus steel, has emerged not only from the country's unique natural and climatic conditions and the historical need to unite for survival, but also from the shared experience of resisting threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and from the collective destiny of those who inhabit Russia.

This unique civilizational experience should become a legacy for all humanity—a foundational



Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,

President of Brazil

"The UN, IMF, and World Bank were created in the last century and no longer reflect today's realities. We must reform these institutions so that Africa, Latin America, and Asia have fair representation. Without this, there can be neither justice nor sustainable development."



pillar of a new world order. Russia's vast and diverse cultural heritage, its outstanding contributions to the arts, its adherence to traditional moral and ethical values, and its commitment to protecting them—grounded in the deep moral teachings of various religions—objectively position the country as a central actor in the creation of a global information and cultural domain, despite ongoing attempts to “cancel” all things Russian.

Modern advances in information technology have brought humanity closer than ever to creating a unified informational environment—a material embodiment of the noosphere theory developed by the eminent Russian scientist Vladimir Vernadsky.

Within this global information space, Russia could take the initiative to launch a truly international and direct dialogue on peace, disarmament, and the preservation of the Earth as our shared home. The use of AI-powered online translation tools would help overcome

language barriers in such direct communication.

A Russian-led initiative, symbolically announced in the year marking the 80th anniversary of the victory over fascism in World War II, would breathe new life into the work of the United Nations and clearly demonstrate the Russian people's genuine commitment to peace. This could mark the beginning of a powerful global anti-war movement.

Russia's value to its potential partners lies, first and foremost, in its ability to provide military, energy, and food security, as well as in its experience of integrating diverse cultures based on principles of mutual respect and equality. At the same time, the country is attractive for its abundant natural and human resources, advanced science, strong education system, and a wealth of unique technologies.

To operate effectively in today's digital world, this community of nations friendly to Russia must

An Open Dialogue for a Just Future

Vedomosti and the Roscongress Foundation are launching an open public discussion on pathways for global development, overcoming socio-economic risks, and exploring new institutional solutions.



be built on shared or compatible technological platforms and standards. Accordingly, the foundation of Russia's long-term policy toward its partners should involve building joint technological, scientific, and educational alliances; launching collaborative projects to develop critical infrastructure and transport corridors; and establishing independent clusters in global logistics, satellite communications, financial systems, information technology, environmental monitoring, and more.

Russia's strategic priority is to proactively form a sovereign center of power that interacts with partners at all levels. This model for restructuring the global economy brings the world closer to a growth-oriented economy that works for all—not just for a privileged few. A reconfigured international model of sustainable development would enable the realization of most declared goals by 2035–2040: eliminating hunger, significantly reducing socio-economic inequality, and strengthening trust, justice, and the ethical dimension of technological progress.

Russia's Role in Shaping Eurasian and Global Alliances


Russia possesses all the necessary capabilities to become an active participant in shaping a new model of multilateral development — one that combines dynamic income growth with high standards of health, urban and rural quality of life, security, and environmental sustainability.

Russia possesses all the necessary capabilities to become an active participant in shaping a new model of multilateral development — one that combines dynamic income growth with high standards of health, urban and rural quality of life, security, and environmental sustainability.

Within the UN framework, BRICS could advance an initiative for global economic co-development. This would be a comprehensive set of measures aimed at reducing tensions among major countries, lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers, limiting unfair competition, protecting the interests of the least developed countries, and maintaining a system of long-term development benchmarks. It would be advisable to organize a series of international negotiations not only on a bilateral basis, but also multilaterally — involving regional integration groups such as BRICS, the SCO, the EAEU, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. Agreements in the tariff and non-tariff spheres should be accompanied by adjustments

to voting balances in international development institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO, and others), in line with the growing share of developing economies in the global system.

The Russian Federation — as one of the world's largest countries in terms of territory and economic potential — occupies a unique position in shaping the new model of globalization. Today, Russia is not only participating in this process, but is poised to become a key unifying force for countries striving to create a more just world order, grounded in the principles of humanism and environmental responsibility. Russia can assume leadership within the emerging global partnership system through concrete initiatives: ensuring energy accessibility, guaranteeing food security, developing cross-border infrastructure, fostering cooperation in high-tech industries and space exploration, and strengthening collective security. In each of these areas, Russia can make a substantial practical contribution.

Figure 13. Index of the Most Attractive Sectors of the Russian Economy for International Business

● Current ● Projected by 2035

Source: Study by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, VEB Research & Expertise Institute, and Vedomosti.

Russia's policy is founded on long-term technological partnerships, and focused on creating joint scientific and educational alliances and implementing large-scale infrastructure projects. Key priorities include the development of cross-border transport corridors, the creation of independent space communications systems and global logistics networks. Special attention is being given to building sovereign financial platforms, secure information systems, and comprehensive environmental monitoring networks.

Russia's strategy centers on establishing a sovereign center of power that is open to mutually beneficial cooperation with diverse partners. This approach has the potential to reshape the global economy — transforming it from an instrument of enrichment for a narrow group of countries into a driver of shared progress. Russia is destined to become one of the architects of a new multipolar world — a world of cooperation rather than confrontation. Without Russia's constructive role and responsible approach, it will be impossible to resolve the key challenges of our time, which affect not only the Eurasian region but the entire planet.

In today's world, economic growth and improvements in quality of life depend less and less on resource volumes and increasingly on levels of trust within the economy and the organization of social connections. For Russians, justice remains a core value — understood in a broad sense as equal access to social services, healthcare, education, and opportunities for dignified employment.

Russia also possesses a unique historical and cultural heritage, enriched by contemporary achievements in the arts. By preserving traditional values and countering their erosion through interfaith dialogue, the country demonstrates the potential to create a unified cultural and informational space within the region.

Russia's competitive and cooperative advantages are numerous. First, its potential in accessible energy technologies, food and water security, and participation in solving global scientific and technological challenges can support a resilient model of economic development. Second, the country's unique logistics capabilities—both in the horizontal Eurasian and vertical meridional directions—remain highly relevant. Third, Russia can offer an alternative development model grounded in traditional values and independent security standards. This model draws upon the nation's distinctive experience of building a socialist society, undergoing rapid industrialization and executing large-scale projects (notably in nuclear and space sectors), followed by the restoration of a market economy and its reintegration into the global system.

Russia is well-positioned to complement and stabilize global production chains. Its engineering expertise and abundant natural resources enable the creation of new enterprises tailored to specific clients and supply chains. Crucially, Russia is one of the few countries capable of ensuring high levels of security and

infrastructural resilience for production facilities—protecting them from both physical and digital threats. Its advanced financial infrastructure and substantial export earnings allow for safer and more stable trade among future alliance members. This will boost partner confidence and mitigate risks in joint ventures.

In building an economy of co-development and partnership, Russia is systematically strengthening trust on three levels. The first is contractual trust - established through digital transparency of

transactions, a stable regulatory framework, and high reputational risks and penalties for misconduct. The second is trust developed through collaborative experience —by fostering professional communities, promoting teamwork and conflict resolution skills, and expanding access to education and social mobility. Finally, the deepest level is trust grounded in a shared vision of the future and collective purpose — which requires strengthening civic identity, fostering long-term thinking, and building an inspiring and inclusive future.

Annex 1.

Achievability of the Sustainable Development Goals (by 2030)

SDG HEALTH INDICATORS		2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Target Value*
2	Prevalence of undernourishment (%)	12,8	12,2	8,7	7,7	7,5	8,5	9,0	9,1	9,1	-	0
	Europe and Northern America	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	<2,5	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	12,8	9,6	5,2	3,2	<2,5	2,5	2,6	2,7	2,7	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	26,7	23,0	18,2	18,4	20,0	21,7	22,1	22,7	23,2	-	
2	Prevalence of population facing severe food insecurity (%)	-	-	-	7,5	9,1	10,6	11,1	10,8	10,7	-	0
	Europe and Northern America	-	-	-	1,3	0,9	1,1	1,4	1,5	1,6	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	-	-	-	1,1	1,4	2,0	1,5	1,4	1,6	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	-	-	-	18,5	21,4	23,3	24,0	23,8	23,8	-	
2	Prevalence of stunting (moderate or severe) among children under 5 years of age (%)	33,0	31,1	27,9	24,6	22,6	22,4	22,4	22,6	22,9	23,2	Sust.*
	Europe and Northern America	5,0	4,5	4,0	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,7	3,8	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	25,5	21,4	17,5	14,4	12,6	12,4	12,4	12,6	12,9	13,1	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	43,4	41,4	37,5	34,3	32,3	31,9	31,8	31,9	32,0	32,2	
3	Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	339,1	296,1	253,8	226,5	225,2	223,5	-	-	-	-	< 70,0
	Europe and Northern America	17,0	14,1	11,6	11,0	11,2	12,9	-	-	-	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	121,1	105,1	82,8	72,1	67,6	73,7	-	-	-	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	807,1	716,3	667,9	597,9	561,4	545,1	-	-	-	-	
3	Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	76,7	63,3	51,7	43,7	39,5	38,7	38,2	38,2	36,7	-	25,0
	Europe and Northern America	9,7	8,2	6,9	6,0	5,3	5,2	5,1	5,1	5,1	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	39,9	28,9	21,5	16,8	14,8	14,7	14,8	14,6	14,3	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	152,0	124,5	102,4	89,0	78,6	75,5	73,5	73,6	68,8	-	

SDG HEALTH INDICATORS		2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Target Value ^a
3	Malaria incidence rate (per 1,000 population at risk)	81,0	76,1	69,3	58,0	57,1	59,1	58,6	58,6	60,4	-	
	Europe and Northern America	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-	Sust.
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	4,0	3,5	4,1	1,6	0,9	0,8	1,0	1,6	1,8	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	353,0	321,4	280,9	236,5	224,9	231,1	226,2	221,6	224,5	-	
3	Mortality rate attributed to cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory disease	22,5	21,2	19,6	18,4	18,0	17,8	17,8	-	-	-	by 1/3 13,1%
	Europe and Northern America	21,8	20,3	17,3	15,8	14,9	14,6	14,6	-	-	-	11,5
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	22,5	21,3	19,2	17,5	16,7	16,5	16,6	-	-	-	12,8
	Sub-Saharan Africa	24,1	23,1	22,8	22,1	21,6	22,0	21,4	-	-	-	15,2
3	Suicide mortality rate (per 100,000 population)	12,5	11,8	10,7	9,8	9,4	9,1	9,2	-	-	-	by 1/3 7,1%
	Europe and Northern America	20,1	18,3	16,7	15,9	14,8	14,3	14,5	-	-	-	11,1
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	13,0	12,3	10,1	8,5	8,4	8,4	8,6	-	-	-	6,7
	Sub-Saharan Africa	7,1	6,9	7,1	7,0	7,2	7,1	7,5	-	-	-	4,7
3	Proportion of the target population covered by all vaccines included in their national programme – DTP3 (%)	72,0	77,0	83,0	85,0	86,0	83,0	81,0	84,0	84,0	-	
	Europe and Northern America	94,0	96,0	94,0	93,0	94,0	93,0	94,0	93,0	94,0	-	Sust.
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	83,0	85,0	94,0	94,0	94,0	92,0	85,0	92,0	88,0	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	50,0	61,0	70,0	69,0	76,0	73,0	72,0	72,0	73,0	-	

* Sust. – sustained increase / decrease in the indicator

SDG DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR													Target Value *
1	Share of Population Living Below the International Poverty Line (%)	29,2	21,6	15,9	10,6	9,0	9,7	10,0	9,0	-	-	-	by 2 half – 6,0%
	Europe and Northern America	1,4	0,6	0,5	0,7	1,0	0,3	0,0	0,2	-	-	-	0,5
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	36	19,3	12	2,4	1,0	1,0	1,0	0,8	-	-	-	2,0
	Sub-Saharan Africa	57,3	49,9	43,1	39,1	37,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,0
1	Proportion of the Working Population Living Below the International Poverty Line (%)	27,6	19,5	14,4	8,4	6,9	7,8	7,5	7,2	7,0	6,9	-	by 2 half – 4,7%
	Europe and Northern America	0,38	0,02	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,005
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	35,3	19,3	12,6	2,12	0,91	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,7	0,8	-	2,1
	Sub-Saharan Africa	54,5	46,7	40,0	35,2	33,6	34,8	34,6	33,9	33,3	32,7	-	17,9
1	Proportion of Population Using Basic Sanitation Services (%)	55,5	61,0	67,1	73,0	77,4	78,5	79,8	80,8	-	-	-	100
	Europe and Northern America	95,9	96,1	96,7	97,1	97,5	97,5	97,6	97,6	-	-	-	-
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	60,4	68,1	76,3	83,9	89,8	91,2	92,6	93,8	-	-	-	-
	Sub-Saharan Africa	22,2	24,7	27,6	30,5	32,9	33,5	34,1	34,7	-	-	-	-
2	Labor Productivity of Small-Scale Food Producers (agricultural output per day, 2017 PPP USD)			68,4	67,3 (2013)	68,1 (2016)	60,7 (2020)	-	-	-	-	-	by half – 134,6%
	Proportion of Countries with Abnormally High Food Prices (%)	-	-	-	10,9	7,3	21,9	9,0	38,3	33,3	-	-	Sust.
	Europe and Northern America	-	-	-	8,7	4,3	32,6	0,0	67,4	56,5	-	-	-
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	-	-	-	13,3	6,7	20,0	13,3	0,0	20,0	-	-	-
4	Sub-Saharan Africa	-	-	14,9	8,5	12,8	14,9	29,8	23,4	-	-	-	-
	Proportion of Children and Youth Achieving Minimum Proficiency in Reading (%)	61,2	60,4	59,6	58,7	58,1	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
	Europe and Northern America	95,2	95,7	96,1	96,5	96,9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Sub-Saharan Africa	33,7	32,8	31,9	31,0	30,2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	Proportion of Population That Has Completed Upper Secondary Education (%)	37,5	40,9	46,9	53,2	56,5	57,2	57,9	58,5	59,0	59,6	-	100
	Europe and Northern America	82,5	84,3	85,6	87,5	88,2	88,5	88,7	88,9	89,1	89,3	-	-
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	33,7	38,7	48,9	62,9	68,8	69,8	70,8	71,7	72,5	73,3	-	-
	Sub-Saharan Africa	19,8	21,6	23,4	25,3	26,9	27,3	27,7	28,1	28,5	28,9	-	-

SDG DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR		2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Target Value *
7	Energy Intensity (megajoules per PPP GDP, constant 2021 international dollars)	5,3	5,1	4,7	4,3	4,0	3,97	3,95	3,87	-	-	by 2 half - 2,2%
	Europe and Northern America	5,1	4,7	4,3	3,8	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,3	-	-	2,0
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	6,1	6,3	5,8	5,0	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,5	-	-	2,7
	Sub-Saharan Africa	6,3	5,6	5,0	4,5	4,4	4,5	4,5	4,4	-	-	2,3
8	Unemployment Rate (%)	6,1	6,2	6,3	6,0	5,6	6,6	6,1	5,3	5,0	5,0	Sust.
	Europe and Northern America	8,0	7,6	9,2	7,6	5,3	7,2	6,2	5,0	4,8	4,9	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	3,5	4,5	4,2	4,1	3,8	4,3	4,1	4,1	3,9	3,8	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	6,2	5,7	5,7	5,7	6,2	6,7	6,9	6,2	5,9	5,9	
9	Share of Medium- and High-Tech Manufacturing in Gross Value Added (GVA) (%)	45,8	44,6	44,7	45,0	44,7	44,6	43,8	44,5	-	-	Sust.
	Europe and Northern America	46,5	44,8	46,2	48,0	47,3	47,2	45,9	48,6	-	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	49,2	49,3	47,9	46,7	46,1	46,1	45,8	45,5	-	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	21,9	17,9	17,9	16,6	16,8	16,3	17,3	16,4	-	-	
11	Proportion of Urban Population Living in Slums (%)	31,2	29,7	27,3	25,0	24,2	24,2	24,7	24,8	-	-	0
	Europe and Northern America	1,4	1,2	0,9	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7	-	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	37,5	33,3	28,8	24,4	21,8	21,7	24,8	24,8	-	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	64,1	60,8	57,2	53,4	50,7	50,2	53,9	53,6	-	-	
16	Number of Victims of Intentional Homicide per 100,000 Population	6,9	6,4	6,1	5,9	5,4	5,3	5,5	5,3	5,2	-	Subst.
	Europe and Northern America	6,9	6,2	3,8	3,8	3,2	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,2	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	2,3	1,2	1,5	1,3	0,9	0,9	1,4	0,8	0,8	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	15,9	14,7	13,9	14,0	12,8	12,2	12,4	12,3	11,9	-	

* Sust. – sustained increase / decrease in the indicator; Subst. – substantial increase / decrease in the indicator

SDG DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR		2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Target Value *
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	6,1	6,3	5,8	5,0	4,6	4,6	4,6	4,5	-	-	2,7
	Sub-Saharan Africa	6,3	5,6	5,0	4,5	4,4	4,5	4,5	4,4	-	-	2,3
8	Unemployment Rate (%)	6,1	6,2	6,3	6,0	5,6	6,6	6,1	5,3	5,0	5,0	Sust.
	Europe and Northern America	8,0	7,6	9,2	7,6	5,3	7,2	6,2	5,0	4,8	4,9	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	3,5	4,5	4,2	4,1	3,8	4,3	4,1	4,1	3,9	3,8	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	6,2	5,7	5,7	5,7	6,2	6,7	6,9	6,2	5,9	5,9	
9	Share of Medium- and High-Tech Manufacturing in Gross Value Added (GVA) (%)	45,8	44,6	44,7	45,0	44,7	44,6	43,8	44,5	-	-	Sust.
	Europe and Northern America	46,5	44,8	46,2	48,0	47,3	47,2	45,9	48,6	-	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	49,2	49,3	47,9	46,7	46,1	46,1	45,8	45,5	-	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	21,9	17,9	17,9	16,6	16,8	16,3	17,3	16,4	-	-	
11	Proportion of Urban Population Living in Slums (%)	31,2	29,7	27,3	25,0	24,2	24,2	24,7	24,8	-	-	0
	Europe and Northern America	1,4	1,2	0,9	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7	-	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	37,5	33,3	28,8	24,4	21,8	21,7	24,8	24,8	-	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	64,1	60,8	57,2	53,4	50,7	50,2	53,9	53,6	-	-	
16	Number of Victims of Intentional Homicide per 100,000 Population	6,9	6,4	6,1	5,9	5,4	5,3	5,5	5,3	5,2	-	Subst.
	Europe and Northern America	6,9	6,2	3,8	3,8	3,2	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,2	-	
	Eastern and South-Eastern Asia	2,3	1,2	1,5	1,3	0,9	0,9	1,4	0,8	0,8	-	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	15,9	14,7	13,9	14,0	12,8	12,2	12,4	12,3	11,9	-	

* Sust. – sustained increase / decrease in the indicator; Subst. – substantial increase / decrease in the indicator

Annex 2. Entrepreneurs' Perspectives on Global Risks and Development Opportunities

As part of the preparation of the report “The Future World Order: Between Systemic Clash and Cooperation”, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Roscongress Foundation, the Institute for Research and Expertise of VEB.RF, the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), and the business daily newspaper Vedomosti conducted a survey of business representatives.

The survey reflects the views of Russian companies regarding the impact of global challenges and positive trends on their operations, the Russian and global economies, as well as the perceived attractiveness of Russian economic sectors for international business.

The study sample comprised 227 companies, of which 38.2% identified as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while the remainder were large businesses. Notably, 36% of respondents belonged to the largest corporations with annual revenues exceeding RUB 15 billion.

An overwhelming majority of organizations—94.2%—reported no foreign ownership (defined as holdings of 25% or more) among their shareholders.

From an industry perspective, the most represented group were companies from the manufacturing sector, accounting for 38.3% of responses. The trade sector

comprised 14.5%. Other sectors included transportation and storage, mining, information and communications—each with approximately 10% share. The survey also included responses from the construction, energy, agriculture sectors (8–9%), professional and scientific activities, education (over 5%), as well as finance, insurance, utilities, tourism, real estate, industrial parks, legal services, and others.


About 93% of companies operate in the Russian market, one-third are present in EAEU countries, and the same proportion indicated a presence in international markets. Overall, 45.8% of respondents conduct business outside Russia, with some overlap between those active in EAEU markets and broader international markets.

At present, the level of global market integration among Russian companies remains low. A significant majority—94% and 84.6%—reported limited involvement as recipients of foreign investment and investors in foreign projects, respectively. Additionally, 78.6% indicated low engagement as exporters of technology, and 54.8% as technology importers.

Looking ahead to 2035, respondents expressed cautious optimism: across all roles, there was a shift toward expecting a “moderate level” of global engagement, with fewer expecting continued low involvement. The greatest expected improvement was in the export of

Figure 2.1 Current level of business engagement in global markets by role

At this moment, %



goods, services, and works: 19.9% anticipated a high level of engagement in this area—an increase of 8.5 percentage points compared to the present.

Perceived Impact of Global Challenges on the World Economy


Around 60% of respondents cited increased instability in the global financial system and heightened restrictions in trade, capital, and technology markets as the most

disruptive challenges. A quarter assessed these issues as having “very strong” impacts.

Challenges such as declining effectiveness of international law and institutions, rising inequality, and increased migration were deemed “very serious” by roughly half of the respondents. Among these, weakened global governance drew the strongest concern, with a quarter rating its impact as “very strong.”

Figure 2.2 Projected business engagement in global markets by 2035 by role

In the period up to 2035, %



Environmental and climate disasters, growing polarization and intolerance, value crises and dehumanization, as well as food insecurity were seen as impactful by around 40% of companies, though more respondents selected “moderate impact.”

The impact of automation, robotization, and virtualization was seen as “moderate” by 41.2%, and “strong” or “very strong” by one-third. A quarter of respondents considered it insignificant.


At the same time, SMEs were significantly more likely than large and the largest enterprises to indicate that the decline in the

effectiveness of international law and global institutions, as well as rising instability in the global financial system, currently exert very weak influence on the global economy. The response shares differed by 10–15 percentage points between groups.

According to one-fifth of SME respondents, growing constraints on food production due to traditional agricultural technologies and the worsening of hunger have already become an acute global problem. Large and the largest enterprises did not share this view: in these respondent groups, the share selecting “very strong impact” for this factor was below 10%.

Figure 2.3 Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges on the World Economy Today

%



Data sorted in descending order by combined share of “very strong / strong” impact responses

Source: survey data

Figure 3.4 Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges on the World Economy Today by Respondent Group

%



Source: Survey data

Approximately 15% of small, medium, and large enterprises believe that the mass displacement of human labor by machines—including robotization, automation, and virtualization—is having a very strong impact on the global economy. Among the largest enterprises (with annual revenue exceeding RUB 15 billion), only 1.6% agreed with this assessment.

More than half of respondents identified the emergence of new materials and technologies and the increasing territorial connectivity enabled by technological innovation as the most impactful positive trends currently influencing the world economy (rated as “strong” or “very strong” impact). Notably, about one-fifth of respondents


selected the emergence of new materials and technologies as a key global development process.

Organizations that participated in the survey generally do not expect critical deterioration in the global economy as a result of the identified negative risks and challenges by 2035. Between 40% and 50% of respondents believe that the situation will stabilize across all major dimensions.

However, a substantial share (approximately 40%) expressed pessimism regarding the future social and environmental outlook. According to these respondents, conditions will likely worsen or significantly deteriorate in the following areas:

Figure 2.5 Assessment of the Impact of Positive Trends on the Global Economy Today

%



Data sorted in descending order by the combined share of “very strong / strong” impact responses

Source: Survey data

- transformations in social structures, rising polarization and intolerance, a crisis of moral and ethical values, and dehumanization;

- the increasing scale and impact of environmental and climate-related disasters on populations and economies;

- growing economic inequality and the expansion of both international and domestic migration.

In contrast, the trend of mass displacement of human labor by machines—robotization, automation, and virtualization of jobs—is viewed positively by one-third of respondents.

Additionally, 28.6% of organizations expect improved global financial system stability. Slightly fewer—around one-quarter—anticipate **positive changes over the next decade in terms of reduced trade and capital restrictions and improved functioning of international law and institutions.

According to approximately one-fifth of SME respondents, the negative impact of several factors is expected to intensify over the next ten years. In contrast, large and the largest companies were significantly less likely to select the response “the situation will worsen.” The majority of these firms believe that conditions will stabilize by 2035.

More than 20% of large companies expect a clear improvement in the functioning of the global financial system. In contrast, SMEs and the largest enterprises were significantly less likely to agree with

this view. While the responses from small and medium-sized businesses skewed toward a pessimistic outlook, the largest companies predominantly chose the response “the situation will stabilize.”

With respect to the trend of mass displacement of human labor by machines—robotization, automation, and virtualization of jobs—the largest companies were the most optimistic: over one-third believe that the situation will improve over the next ten years (26.6% selected “likely to improve,” and 7.8% chose “will improve”). Among large businesses, the combined share of positive responses was lower, at 27.9%.

At the same time, fewer than 3% of large and the largest enterprises expect the negative impact of this factor to intensify significantly by 2035. Among SMEs, however, 17.8% selected the most pessimistic option. At the same time, 30.1% of small and medium-sized enterprises anticipate that the severity of the issue related to automation, robotization, and virtualization in the global economy will diminish over the coming decade.

Positive trends are expected to play an even greater role in shaping the global economy through 2035. Across all areas considered, respondents anticipate improvements: nearly 70% foresee advances in innovation—particularly the emergence of new materials and technologies—while slightly fewer (around two-thirds) expect enhanced territorial connectivity through technological means. Roughly half of respondents


expect positive developments over the next decade in areas such as the use of renewable energy and waste recycling; healthcare, including personalized medicine, reduced child mortality, and increased life expectancy; and improved access to education, universalization of knowledge, and professional training across countries. Overall, entrepreneurs view

the influence of positive development trends on the global economy with optimism: fewer than 15% of companies indicated that the situation is likely to worsen.

When assessing the dynamics of positive trends over the next ten years, companies of different sizes responded similarly—with one notable exception: large enterprises

Figure 2.6 Assessment of Changes in the Impact of Global Challenges on the World Economy by 2035

%



Data sorted in ascending order by the combined share of "likely to worsen / will worsen" responses

Source: Survey data

are more optimistic than the largest companies and SMEs about future improvements in education access, knowledge dissemination, and professional training across the globe.

More than one-fifth of large enterprises believe that progress in the education sector will continue. Among the largest enterprises and SMEs, only about one in ten respondents agreed with this view, with most selecting “the situation will stabilize” or “likely to improve.”

Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges and Positive Trends on the Russian Economy

According to most respondents (around 60%), the Russian economy—like the global economy—is most significantly affected by two factors: the expansion and intensification of restrictions in markets for goods, capital, and technologies, and the rising instability of the global financial system. Additionally, around half of the surveyed companies identified the ongoing decline in the effectiveness of international law and global institutions as a serious challenge.

According to 41.3% of participants, the growing vulnerability of economic and civil infrastructure to terrorist threats has a strong impact on the Russian economy. Meanwhile, the issue of growing economic inequality and the scale of international and domestic migration** ranked fourth in significance for the Russian context (whereas it ranked in the top three in assessments of its impact on the global economy).

Respondents generally assessed the impact of environmental and social challenges on the Russian economy as weaker than their impact on the global economy. Between 35% and 40% of respondents rated the influence of such problems—such as social disintegration, rising intolerance, the crisis of moral values and dehumanization; environmental and climate-related disasters; food production constraints; and mass automation and robotization of jobs—as “weak” or “rather weak.” A similar proportion rated the influence of these problems as “moderate.”


About one-fifth of SMEs viewed challenges related to the effectiveness of international institutions and the global financial system as not particularly significant for Russia. In contrast, large and the largest companies tended to choose the option that these factors have a moderate impact on the national economy. In fact, nearly 70% of large enterprises stated that the instability of the global financial system exerts a strong or very strong influence on the Russian economy.

Across all company groups—small, medium, and large—about 55% agreed with this view. Interestingly, the largest companies considered the impact of financial system instability stronger at the global level than at the national level, with a difference of nearly 14 percentage points.

In contrast, for social challenges—such as constraints on food production, degradation of social cohesion, and the moral crisis—SMEs

Figure 2.7 Respondent Group Perspectives on the Future Impact of Global Challenges on the World Economy (to 2035)

%



Source: Survey data

were significantly more likely than the largest enterprises to state that these issues have a strong or very strong impact on the Russian economy.

For companies with annual revenues above RUB 15 billion, these problems seemed far less relevant. Interestingly, when assessing the impact of agricultural issues on the global economy, more than a third of the largest companies responded that the impact is rather strong. Yet for the Russian economy, 34.1% of these companies stated that such issues have only a weak influence.

The responses of large companies (with revenue under RUB 15 billion) were more aligned with SMEs


than with the largest enterprises. However, on issues relating to moral and social values, large companies were more likely than SMEs to select the neutral option: “moderate impact.”

More than half of the largest companies said that mass automation and robotization have a weak impact on the Russian economy, whereas they had assessed its global influence as moderate. Among small, medium, and large firms, about one-third agreed with the “weak impact” assessment.

Over 45% of the largest companies stated that terrorist threats currently play a significant role in affecting the Russian economy. This

Figure 2.8 Projected Change in the Impact of Positive Trends on the Global Economy by 2035

%




Data sorted in descending order by the combined share of “likely to improve / will improve” responses

Source: Survey data

Figure 2.9 Evaluation of how positive trends will affect the global economy through 2035, as viewed by different respondent groups

%



view was shared by only a third of SME respondents. Still, nearly one-fifth of SMEs and large businesses selected the definitive answer: “very strong impact.” Among the largest firms, fewer than 10% held that view.

By contrast, when assessing the same threat at the global level, responses across company sizes were more uniform.

Assessments of the positive trends’ current impact on the Russian economy closely mirror perceptions of their global influence—though their perceived importance for Russia is slightly lower. This is especially true in relation to innovation in materials and technologies. Fewer than half of all respondents selected “strong” or “rather strong” for their impact on Russia, compared to about 60% for the global economy.

Positive trends received relatively consistent assessments across company sizes. However, for innovation in materials and technologies, notable differences emerged: 20% of SMEs view their impact on the Russian economy as “very strong,” compared to less than 7% of large companies and only 3% of the largest companies. Meanwhile, 45% of large companies viewed the impact as “moderate,” and around 45% of the largest companies rated the impact as “weak” or “very weak.”

Companies’ future outlooks are cautiously optimistic. Between 45% and 53% of respondents believe that global challenges affecting the Russian economy will become more stable over the next 10 years.

Moreover, the significance and severity of environmental and social challenges expected to impact the Russian economy in the coming years are perceived to be lower than their relevance to the global economy. As previously noted, around 40% of respondents anticipate a deterioration in the global situation due to shifts in social structure, increasing fragmentation and intolerance, a crisis of moral values and dehumanization, as well as growing economic inequality and the scale of international and domestic migration. In contrast, when applied to the Russian economy, companies were less likely to forecast deterioration in these areas—the shares differ by approximately 10 percentage points.

Forecasts provided by SMEs for the next ten years tend to be pessimistic. Between 20% and 30% of companies in this group expect negative developments, both in relation to economic factors and socio-legal influences.

Assessments provided by large companies tend to be more optimistic—they were significantly more likely than SMEs and the largest enterprises to select the options “the situation will stabilize” or “is likely to improve.” For instance, about one-third of large businesses expect improvements in the functioning of international law and in the agricultural sector.


The largest enterprises with revenues exceeding 15 billion rubles were more inclined than other survey participants to choose the response “the situation will normalize by 2035.”

When evaluating the prospects for societal development and moral values, a quarter of large and the largest enterprises believe that the situation in Russia will improve over the next ten years. Slightly fewer—around one-fifth of companies in this group—expect a reduction in the vulnerability of the country's infrastructure to terrorist threats.

Most organizations anticipate an increasing relevance of the analyzed positive trends for the Russian economy. The results are consistent: approximately 65% of respondents believe that innovation in materials and technology and the expansion of territorial communication connectivity through the use of new technologies will develop most actively.

Figure 2.10 Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges on the Russian Economy Today

%



Data sorted in descending order by the combined share of "very strong / strong" impact responses

Source: survey data

Figure 2.11 Respondent Group Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges on the Russian Economy Today

%




Source: survey data

Around 60% of participants believe that by 2035, healthcare will continue to advance—including personalized medicine, reduced child mortality, and increased life expectancy—positively impacting the Russian economy.

Half of the respondents predict an improvement in the Russian economy driven by the expansion of renewable energy use and waste recycling, as well as by increased access to education and the universalization of knowledge and professional training across countries.

Figure 2.12 Assessment of the Impact of Positive Trends on the Russian Economy Today

%



Data sorted in descending order by the combined share of "very strong / strong" impact responses

Source: Survey data

Figure 2.13 Assessment of the Impact of Positive Trends on the Russian Economy Today by Respondent Group

%



Source: survey data


Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges and Positive Trends on Company Operations

Overall, the existing challenges appear less relevant to companies themselves than to the Russian and global economies. While respondents acknowledged the significance of the growing instability of the global financial system and the weakening of international law for the broader economy, they did not consider these factors to have a substantial impact on the

operations of their own organizations. The discrepancy between the shares of responses selecting “strong” and “very strong” influence when assessing the impact on the Russian economy versus company-level operations reaches 20.9 and 28.6 percentage points, respectively.

A similarly wide gap is observed in responses regarding the influence of challenges linked to rising economic inequality, increased migration, and growing vulnerability of economic

Figure 2.14 Projected Change in the Impact of Global Challenges on the Russian Economy by 2035




Data sorted in ascending order by the combined share of “will worsen / likely to worsen” responses

Source: survey data

Figure 2.15 Projected Change in the Impact of Global Challenges on the Russian Economy by 2035 According to Different Respondent Groups

%



Source: survey data

and civil infrastructure to terrorist threats. In these cases, the deviation exceeds 15 percentage points.

Roughly half of survey participants stated that factors related to international law, economic inequality and migration, and terrorist threats have little impact on their companies' day-to-day activities.


Opinions on the impact of the instability in the global financial system were more evenly distributed. Fewer than a third of respondents denied any influence from global financial markets. Approximately the same number reported a moderate impact, while 35.8% of companies classified the influence as strong or very strong.

The greatest harm to companies, among all listed global challenges, comes from the expansion and intensification of restrictions in goods, capital, and technology markets. A total of 45.7% of respondents identified these problems as highly relevant to their operations, and 30.2% noted a moderate influence. In this case, the deviation between assessments of the impact on companies and on the Russian economy is relatively small—11.5 percentage points.

Companies reported being least affected by such challenges as the automation and virtualization of jobs, the expansion of environmental and climate-related disasters, social disintegration

Figure 2.16 Projected Change in the Impact of Global Challenges on the Russian Economy by 2035

%



Data sorted in descending order by the combined share of "likely to improve / will improve" responses

Source: survey data

and moral decline, and agricultural constraints causing food insecurity. Between 65% and 75% of respondents indicated weak or very weak influence from these issues. For comparison, when assessing the impact of these challenges on the Russian or global economy, organizations more often selected “moderate influence.”

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large companies reported that problems related to the decline in the effectiveness of international law and institutions generally do not affect them. Over 41% of respondents in these groups chose “very weak influence.” In contrast, only 16% of major corporations (those with revenues over 15 billion rubles) gave the same response. For these larger companies, 42% believed the influence to be moderate.

The opposite is true when assessing the impact of constraints in traditional agriculture and socio-cultural decline. A total of 69.1% of large corporations said that agricultural problems do not affect their operations. Among large enterprises, this share was 54.3%, and among SMEs, 45.5%.

When evaluating the influence of societal transformation, moral crises, and dehumanization, 54% of major corporations said these factors had no meaningful impact. Among SMEs and large companies, 35% to 40% agreed. However, 14.3% of SMEs reported a very strong impact from these social issues, while fewer than 7% of respondents from larger companies did the same.

Positive trends—such as increased territorial connectivity due to new technologies and the emergence of new materials and technologies—have nearly the same level of impact on companies as on the Russian economy overall. More than 40% of business representatives agreed with this view.

However, when assessing the influence of material and technological innovation on companies, significantly more respondents selected “weak” or “very weak” compared to assessments of its impact on the national economy (27.7% vs. 17.1%).

Social improvements in education and healthcare significantly affect about one-fifth of companies. Approximately 40% stated that these trends are currently irrelevant to their business.

These social trends are perceived as more relevant to the national economy than to individual companies. The gap reaches 19 percentage points when comparing the share of responses selecting “strong / very strong influence” regarding the impact of health care development, personalized medicine, reduced child mortality, and increased life expectancy.

Half of the respondents do not observe any impact on company operations related to developments in alternative energy (use of renewable energy sources) and waste recycling. When assessing the influence of this trend on the Russian economy, only one-third of respondents selected the options “weak/very weak impact.” However, nearly the same share of business representatives


believe that positive advances in energy and resource use exert a strong influence on companies, as those who previously noted its significance for the national economy.

The impact of positive trends was evaluated similarly across companies of different sizes. The only exception: one-third of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) deny that increased access to education and the universalization of knowledge and professional training across countries currently affects their operations. In contrast, only one-tenth of large and largest enterprises share this view. Approximately 50–55% of

respondents from these groups selected the option “moderate impact of the educational trend on company operations.”

Respondents’ assessments of the future impact of global challenges on company activities are notably more pessimistic than their views regarding the Russian economy overall. They were twice as likely to select the unequivocally negative option — “the situation for companies will deteriorate in the next ten years” — compared to when they forecasted the impact of the same problems and factors on the national economy.

Figure 2.17 Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges on Company Operations at Present




Data sorted by the total share of responses indicating “very strong / strong” influence

Source: survey data


Figure 2.18 Assessment of the Impact of Global Challenges on Company Operations at Present According to Different Respondent Groups

%


**Сокращение эффективности функционирования
международного права и международных
институтов**




**Рост неустойчивости глобальной
финансовой системы**




**Рост масштаба и интенсивности ограничений
на рынках товаров, капитала и технологий**




**Рост экономического неравенства и масштабов
международной и внутренней миграции**



**Рост масштабов экологических и климатических
катаклизмов и их влияния на население и
экономику**



**Рост уязвимости экономической и гражданской
инфраструктуры перед террористическими
угрозами**



Very Weak Weak Moderate Strong Very Strong

Source: survey data

Between 40% and 50% of survey participants anticipate degradation due to negative social and environmental developments. However, the next most common response was that “the situation for companies will stabilize by 2035.” Although selected slightly less frequently — by 34% (in the context of growing ecological and climate-related disasters and their impact on population and the economy) to 40% (in relation to rising agricultural constraints, increasing economic inequality, migration, societal fragmentation, moral crisis, and dehumanization) — it still represents a significant share.


When projecting the trajectory of international legal frameworks and institutional

effectiveness, as well as the vulnerability of economic and civil infrastructure to terrorist threats, neutral assessments (“situation will stabilize”) begin to outweigh negative ones, though the margin remains modest — around 6–7 percentage points. Slightly less than one-fifth of respondents expect an improvement in these areas.

As for the future of restrictions on goods, capital, and technology markets, specifically in terms of their impact on business operations, one-quarter of respondents expressed optimism. In contrast, 35% hold a negative view, while 40% expect the situation to normalize by 2035.

Figure 2.19 Assessment of the Impact of Positive Trends on Company Operations at Present

%




Data sorted by total share of responses indicating “very strong / strong” influence

Source: survey data

Figure 2.20 Assessment of the Impact of Positive Trends on Company Operations at Present According to Different Respondent Groups

%



Company forecasts concerning massive workforce displacement by machines, automation, and virtualization are nearly identical whether applied to their own operations or to the national economy: 30% of respondents expect improvement in this domain.


Roughly half of all companies hope for stabilization in the global financial system as it pertains to their activities by 2035. The share of neutral responses in this case is almost identical to those made when evaluating this issue's impact

on Russia's economy. However, negative assessments ("situation will worsen") were more frequent when respondents considered the implications for their own companies, rather than the national economy.

Between 40% and 50% of small, medium-sized, and large companies expect that the effectiveness of international law and institutions will deteriorate or likely deteriorate in relation to their operations by 2035. In contrast, the largest enterprises with annual

Figure 2.21 Projected Impact of Global Challenges on Company Operations by 2035

%




Data sorted by total share of responses indicating "situation will worsen / likely worsen"

Source: survey data

Figure 2.22 Assessment of Changes in the Impact of Global Challenges on Company Operations by 2035 According to Different Respondent Groups

%



Source: survey data

revenues exceeding 15 billion rubles express significantly greater optimism: only one-quarter of respondents in this group anticipate deterioration in this area, while the majority—62%—believe that the situation will eventually stabilize. Furthermore, half of the largest companies expect that the challenges stemming from growing economic inequality and the scale of international and internal migration will tend toward stabilization over the next decade. As for large companies with annual revenues below 15 billion rubles, one-fifth of respondents believe that the dynamics of this factor will improve. Other business representatives selected the responses “will likely improve / will improve” half as often. Nearly 30% of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) are confident that the situation will definitively worsen.

Regarding the development of processes related to the mass replacement of humans by machines, as well as robotization, automation, and virtualization of workplaces, companies of different sizes expressed similar views: small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were more likely to choose the clearly negative option “the situation for organizations will worsen over the next ten years” (share: 23%), while large enterprises were significantly more optimistic. The assessments of the largest companies with revenues over 15 billion rubles leaned toward the response “the situation is more likely to improve.”

Respondents evaluated the expected progress of positive trends by 2035 in relation to company

operations almost identically to their assessments of the impact of these trends on the Russian economy as a whole. The variations in responses fall within the margin of statistical error for both positive and neutral answers, with two exceptions: energy and healthcare.

One-third of respondents expect the scale of renewable energy use and waste recycling to grow, positively influencing companies themselves. By contrast, when forecasting the situation over the next decade in relation to the national economy, half of the enterprises selected the responses “the situation in alternative energy and resource use is more likely to improve/improve.”


A similar gap in the share of positive responses was recorded regarding the development of healthcare, reduction in child mortality, and increase in life expectancy. According to 60% of respondents, these trends will positively affect the Russian economy. However, for the companies themselves, this trend is seen as less relevant—only 43% of business representatives selected the options “the situation is more likely to improve/improve.”

The Most Attractive Sectors of the Russian Economy for International Business Today and in the Next Ten Years

At present, the sectors of the Russian economy most attractive to international business—according to an overwhelming majority of respondents—are mineral extraction (84.6%), energy (72.3%), and

Figure 2.23 Assessment of the Impact of Positive Trends on Company Operations by 2035

%



Data sorted by total share of responses indicating "likely improve / improve"

Source: survey data

agriculture and forestry (68.7%). More than half of all respondents also consider the field of scientific research and development to be appealing for international business.


Group of sectors — "real estate," "transportation (including logistics services) and warehousing," "healthcare and medical services," and "manufacturing: materials production" — were noted by respondents in over 40% of cases.

Over the next ten years, according to Russian companies, interest is expected to significantly increase in scientific research and development, real estate, healthcare and

medical services, and manufacturing— both in materials production and in the manufacturing of machinery and equipment. Respondents also anticipate that international business will find Russian information technology and software more attractive.

SMEs and large companies significantly more often than the largest enterprises selected energy and real estate as the most attractive sectors at present. Small and medium-sized organizations see greater international business interest than other companies in Russian scientific R&D, the education sector, and the "media and entertainment" industry.

Figure 2.24 Attractiveness of Sectors of the Russian Economy for International Business Today and in the Outlook to 2035




Companies could select multiple response options; therefore, the total shares do not add up to 100%

Source: survey data

Figure 2.25 Attractiveness of Sectors of the Russian Economy for International Business Today according to Different Respondent Groups

(only sectors with significant differences are highlighted), %




Companies could select multiple response options; therefore, the total shares do not add up to 100%

Source: survey data

Figure 2.26 Attractiveness of Sectors of the Russian Economy for International Business by 2035 According to Different Respondent Groups

(only sectors with significant differences are highlighted), %



Companies could select multiple response options; therefore, the total shares do not add up to 100%

Source: survey data

Large companies with revenue under 15 billion rubles also much more frequently noted the attractiveness of the telecommunications sector than the largest enterprises — the gap in this case reaches 20 percentage points.

Looking ahead to 2035, large companies are placing greater emphasis on the energy sector, real estate, and manufacturing machinery and equipment than enterprises with revenue exceeding 15 billion rubles.

A considerable number of respondents from SMEs and large companies agree that, in the next decade, international businesses will show interest in Russia's material production and telecommunications sectors (approximately 60% for the former and over 40% for the latter). Among the largest companies, fewer than half believe that international businesses will find Russian material production attractive, and only 27.4% of respondents in this group included the telecommunications sector in their lists. SMEs are much more optimistic than the largest enterprises about the prospects of the utilities (housing and communal services) and the "media and entertainment" industry — the gap in assessments exceeds 14 percentage points.

Key Findings

Currently, the level of companies' integration into the global market is generally low. However, when assessing their future prospects up to 2035, companies expressed cautious optimism: assessments of

international market presence in all roles shifted in favor of "moderate level of involvement" — respondents significantly less frequently selected "low level of involvement."

Most respondents identified the growing instability of the global financial system and the increasing scale and intensity of restrictions in markets for goods, capital, and technology as the most serious and pressing global challenges currently exerting strong negative pressure on the global economy. Issues related to the declining effectiveness of international law and global institutions, rising economic inequality, increased international and internal migration, and the growing vulnerability of economic and civil infrastructure to terrorist threats were also commonly cited, though slightly less frequently.

The surveyed organizations generally do not expect critical changes in the global economy as a result of these challenges by 2035. Between 40% and 50% of respondents believe that the situation will stabilize across all key areas.

Most respondents regard the emergence of new materials and technologies, and enhanced territorial connectivity enabled by technological advances, as the most relevant positive trends currently having a strong or very strong impact on the global economy. The emergence of new materials and technologies was identified as a key process by roughly one-fifth of those surveyed.

By 2035, positive trends are expected to play an even greater role in shaping the global economy. Across all trends analyzed, improvement is anticipated.

Similar to the global economy, the Russian economy is perceived to be most affected by the growing scale and intensity of market restrictions and the instability of the global financial system — according to nearly 60% of respondents. Additionally, half of the companies identified the declining effectiveness of international law and institutions as a serious challenge.

Company forecasts for the future are cautiously optimistic. A majority of survey participants (45% to 53%) believe that the situation regarding global challenges in relation to the Russian economy will become more stable over the next decade.

Current assessments of the impact of positive trends on the Russian economy closely align with those for the global economy, though there is a slight indication that their importance for Russia is somewhat lower. This is most evident in the assessment of the impact of innovation — particularly the emergence of new materials and technologies.

Just as with projections for global economic development, most organizations expect positive trends to become increasingly relevant for the Russian economy. About 65% of respondents concluded that innovation in materials and technology, and the enhanced connectivity of territories due to

their application, will be among the most dynamically developing processes.

Overall, global challenges are perceived as less directly relevant to individual companies than to the Russian or global economy as a whole. While respondents recognize the significance of global financial instability and the declining effectiveness of international legal institutions, they do not believe these issues strongly affect the daily operations of their organizations.

Among all the global challenges listed, the growing scale and intensity of restrictions in markets for goods, capital, and technology was identified as the most detrimental to companies. A total of 45.7% of respondents considered this problem highly relevant for their operations today, while 30.2% viewed its impact as moderate.

When forecasting the future impact of global challenges on company operations, respondents were more pessimistic than when assessing the impact on the Russian economy overall. They were twice as likely to give a clearly negative forecast — “the company's situation is expected to worsen over the next ten years” — compared to similar forecasts regarding the national economy.

Positive trends — such as increased territorial connectivity enabled by new technologies and the emergence of new materials and technologies — are perceived to influence company activities nearly as strongly as they do the Russian

economy overall. Over 40% of business representatives agreed with this view.

Projections of the impact of positive trends on company operations by 2035 were nearly identical to projections regarding their effect on the Russian economy, with two exceptions: energy and healthcare. Assessments of these trends' impact on companies were more neutral or negative than their perceived impact on the broader economy.

Currently, the sectors considered most attractive to international business by an overwhelming majority of respondents include:

mineral extraction (84.6%), energy (72.3%), and agriculture and forestry (68.7%). More than half of respondents also believe the field of scientific research and development is attractive to international investors.

Over the next ten years, Russian companies anticipate a significant increase in international interest in scientific research and development, real estate, healthcare and medical services, and manufacturing — both materials and machinery and equipment. Respondents also believe that Russia's IT sector and locally developed software will become more attractive to international business.

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